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Intuitionistic logic is an important variant of classical logic, but it is not as well-
understood, even in the propositional case. In this thesis, we describe a faithful
representation of intuitionistic propositional formulas as tree automata. This
representation permits a number of consequences, including a characterization
theorem for free Heyting algebras, which are the intutionistic analogue of free
Boolean algebras, and a new algorithm for solving equations over intuitionistic
propositional logic.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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viiCHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Intuitionistic logic has been explored for many years as a language for computer
science, with a guiding principle being the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov in-
terpretation, under which intuitionistic proofs of implication are functions and
existence proofs require witnesses. Higher-order intuitionistic systems which
can express a great deal of mathematics, such as Girard’s System F and Martin-
L¨ of’s type theory (good references are [9] and [3]), have been developed and
implemented by prominent computer scientists such as Constable, Huet and
Coquand (see [2] and [1]). With all this development and with the existence of
well-established topological, Kripke, and categorical semantics for intuitionistic
systems, it may come as a surprise that many fundamental structural properties
of intuitionistic propositional calculus have not been developed. By way of con-
trast, corresponding issues for classical logics have been settled for at least 75
years.
For each n ∈ N, let Vn = {x0,...,xn−1} and let Fn be the set of propositional
sentences in variables Vn. Let 'i and 'c be the intuitionistic and classical logical
equivalence relations respectively.
The classical Lindenbaum algebra Bn is deﬁned as Fn/'c. It is the free
Boolean algebra on n generators. It is completely understood and can be char-
acterized quite easily. For example, Bn is isomorphic to the algebra of subsets of
Vn, hPP(Vn),∪,∩,∅,P(Vn)i, where ∅ is the bottom element and P(Vn) is the
top element. The set S ⊆ P(Vn) corresponds to the formula
_
S∈S


^
xi∈S
xi ∧
^
xi/ ∈S
¬xi

.
1If we let Up(P) be the set of upward-closed subsets of a partially ordered set
P, thenwemayalsodescribethealgebraofsubsetsofVn ashUp(Pn),∪,∩,∅,Pni,
where Pn is P(Vn) giventhetrivialorderingwhereanytwodistinctelementsare
incomparable.
Of course, this was nothing more than a cosmetic change. However, we
have the following: Let the intuitionistic Lindenbaum algebra Hn be Fn/'i.
Then it is the case that Hn is (isomorphic to) a subalgebra of the algebra of sets
hUp(U(n)),∪,∩,∅,U(n)i, where U(n) is a partial order deﬁned in Chapter 2
that contains Pn as its maximal elements.
Call an upward-closed subset of U(n) deﬁnable if it corresponds to an ele-
ment of Hn. Characterizing exactly which upward-closed subsets of U(n) are
deﬁnable would help in understanding the structure of Hn. My answer to this
is given in Theorem 1 where I show that an upward-closed subset of U(n)
is deﬁnable just in case it is recognizable by a speciﬁc type of tree automa-
ton, which I call a preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automa-
ton (the elements of U(n) are considered to be labeled trees in a natural way).
A preﬁx-closed tree automaton is one with no transition to an accept state from
a sequence containing a non-accept state. The term “intuitionistic-equivalence-
respecting” is explained below.
Given a subset S of a partial order P, let Sl be
{p ∈ P | (∀q ≥ p)(∃r ≥ q)(∃s ∈ S)r ≥ s}.
In Proposition 6 it is shown as an application of Theorem 1 that all subsets of
U(n) of the form Sl where S ⊆ U(n) is ﬁnite are deﬁnable. From the existence
of this large class of deﬁnable subsets alone we can show in Proposition 15 that
all countable partial orders order-embed into any Hn where n ≥ 2.
2UsingProposition6andsomecombinatorialreasoningabout U(n), weshow
in Theorem 4 that every Hm lattice-embeds as an interval into Hn, where m ≥ 1
and n ≥ 2, a result that was ﬁrst shown by Mardaev in [13].
We may think of a tree automaton as assigning a state to each tree; namely,
the ﬁnal state of the automaton after processing the tree. We may consider
all ﬁnite Kripke models to be ﬁnite labeled trees in a very simple (essentially
obvious) way; thus, we may consider automata which accept sets of Kripke
models. The explanation for the term “intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting au-
tomaton” is as follows. Call two ﬁnite Kripke models (deﬁned in Chapter 2)
intuitionistically equivalent if they force exactly the same propositional formulas.
An intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automaton is then one with the prop-
erty that for each of its states, the set of Kripke models assigned to that state is
closed under intuitionistic equivalence. Part of the power of this notion comes
from the fact that, by Proposition 4, there is a simple combinatorial condition
that can be used to determine if two ﬁnite Kripke models are intuitionistically
equivalent.
By showing that if the set of Kripke models accepted by a tree automa-
ton is closed under intuitionistic-equivalence and under taking upward-closed
submodels then it is equivalent to a preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-equivalence-
respecting automaton, it is shown in Theorem 2 that every such set of ﬁnite
Kripke models is of the form {M | M  φ} for some φ (the converse is also
true and follows from the preliminaries in Chapter 2).
For every ﬁnite Kripke model there is a unique minimal ﬁnite Kripke model
to which it is equivalent which is called its p-morphic reduction. The set U(n)
essentially consists of the reduced Kripke models and the ordering is given by
3embeddability as an upward-closed submodel.
One of the properties of a intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting tree automa-
ton is that if T1 and T2 are two trees to which it assigns the same state, then there
is a tree T whose root has T1 and T2 as its sole subtrees such that it assigns T the
same state as T1 and T2. As a consequence of this and the pigeonhole principle,
if S is a deﬁnable subset of U(n) with an inﬁnite sequence {s1,s2,...} ⊆ S of
incomparable elements, then there must be some i 6= j and s ∈ S with s < si,sj.
This is used in Subsection 4.2.3 to show constructively that Hn is incomplete for
n ≥ 2 (this is shown nonconstructively in [4]) and in Proposition 13 to show that
the countable atomless Boolean algebra does not lattice-embed into any Hn.
Call an element a of a lattice L join-irreducible if for all b, c ∈ L, if a = b ∨ c
then a = b or a = c. It is known that any element of Hn can be written uniquely
as a ﬁnite join of pairwise incomparable join-irreducibles, a property which is
not shared by, for example, the countable atomless Boolean algebra, which does
not have any join-irreducibles (see [10] for a general reference on lattice theory).
Therefore if we could characterize the set Jn of join-irreducibles in Hn, we would
have a characterization of Hn.
Each intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automaton comes with a partial
ordering on its set of states. In Proposition 8 it is shown that if φ ∈ Hn and T is a
intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting tree automaton corresponding to it, then,
essentially, φ is join-irreducible iff T ’s set of accepting states has a minimum
element. This fact is used together with Proposition 6 and some facts about
the combinatorics of U(n) to show in Theorem 3 that Jn can be partitioned into
J1,n, J2,n, J3,n and J4,n and each of those suborders can be characterized up to
isomorphism. Furthermore, J2,n, J3,n, and J4,n are independent of n.
4In Chapter 7, two results with the same ﬂavor are shown which use Theo-
rem 1 more deeply than any of the previous results. By Proposition 30, if φ is a
formula with a free variable x and a representing automaton T , then if there is
any ψ such that φ[ψ/x] is a tautology, then there is such a ψ with a representing
automaton with no more states than T has. As a corollary to this, we get that the
problem of deciding whether or not equations φ(x) = > in intuitionistic logic
have solutions is decidable, a fact which was ﬁrst shown by Rybakov in [16]. By
a slight modiﬁcation of Proposition 30, we get that the embedding of Hn into
the full subalgebra of upward-closed subsets of U(n) is existentially closed.
It was ﬁrst determined in [15] and [14] that for all n, there are inﬁnitely many
intuitionistically inequivalent propositional formulas over n variables. A natu-
ral question is then to ask whether various fragments of intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic obtained by restricting the connectives allowed are also inﬁnite.
The most difﬁcult case is that where the single connective → is allowed, and
this case was solved by algebraic means in [8], where it is proven that for all
n, the number of intuitionistically inequivalent formulas over n variables using
only the connective → is ﬁnite.
Subsequent proofs of this fact using semantic methods (i.e., Kripke models)
are given in [17] and [7]. An excellent analysis of all fragments of intuitionistic
logic using the methods of [7] is given in [11].
In Chapter 3, I will present a purely combinatorial proof of this fact (which,
in particular, does not rely on the tree automata representation given in Chap-
ter 4) by specifying certain rewrite rules by which one can rewrite any proposi-
tional formula over n variables with only the connective → into an equivalent
one whose length is less than a constant depending only on n.
5CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND NOTATION
2.1 Intuitionistic Propositional Logic
Deﬁnition 1 (Intuitionistic Propositional Logic). Let ω +1 be {0,1,2,...}∪{ω}
as usual. Note that contrary to common practice, the variable n will sometimes
be used to range over ω + 1 as well as sometimes ranging over ω.
Let Vω = {x0,x1,...} be a countably inﬁnite set whose elements will be
considered to be propositional variables. For n < ω, let Vn = {x0,...,xn−1}.
The symbols x, y and z will be used as metavariables to range over the Vn which
is appropriate in context. Symbols of the form xi may also be used this way if
no confusion will result.
For each n ∈ ω + 1, let Fn be the set of well-formed propositional formulas
deﬁned over Vn. The connectives of propositional logic are taken to be ∨, ∧, and
→ together with a constant ⊥. The negation ¬φ is deﬁned to be φ → ⊥.
The set IPC ⊆ Fω is the smallest set containing, for all x, y, and z ∈ Vω:
1. x → (y → x)
2. (x → (y → z)) → ((x → y) → (x → z))
3. (x ∧ y) → x
4. (x ∧ y) → y
5. x → (y → (x ∧ y))
6. x → (x ∨ y)
67. y → (x ∨ y)
8. (x → z) → ((y → z) → ((x ∨ y) → z))
9. ⊥ → x
and which is closed under the inference rules:
1. Modus Ponens: If φ ∈ IPC and φ → ψ ∈ IPC, then ψ ∈ IPC.
2. Substitution: If φ(¯ x) ∈ IPC, then φ( ¯ ψ) ∈ IPC for any formulas ¯ ψ.
We say that φ is a tautology (or an intuitionistic tautology) if φ ∈ IPC and that
φ implies ψ (or φ intuitionistically implies ψ), if φ → ψ ∈ IPC.
If Γ is a set of formulas such that the conjunction of some ﬁnite subset of
Γ implies ψ, then we write Γ ` ψ. If Γ = {φ}, then we may write φ ` ψ for
{φ} ` ψ.
Deﬁnition 2 (Heyting Algebras). A Heyting algebra is a tuple hH,∨,∧,→,⊥,>i
where H is a set, ∨, ∧, and → are binary operations on H, and ⊥ and > are
constants in H satisfying the following requirements:
1. hH,∨,∧,⊥,>i is a distributive lattice with 0 and 1.
2. For all a, b ∈ H, a → b = sup{c | c ∧ a ≤ b}.
As usual, an order relation ≤ is deﬁned on H by a ≤ b iff a ∧ b = a.
Lemma 1 (See [12]). The class of Heyting algebras is a variety.
Deﬁnition 3 (Free Heyting Algebras). The existence of free Heyting algebras is
given by Lemma 1. For n ∈ ω + 1, the free Heyting algebra on n generators is
denoted Hn.
7Deﬁnition 4 (Lindenbaum Algebras). Let n ∈ ω + 1. Deﬁne the equivalence
relation ' on Fn by φ ' ψ iff φ ↔ ψ ∈ IPC.
The Lindenbaum algebra of intuitionistic propositional logic on Vn is deﬁned to
be the tuple hH,∨,∧,→,⊥,>i, where H = Fn/' and [φ] ∨ [ψ] = [φ ∨ ψ], etc. It
can be veriﬁed that these operations are all well-deﬁned.
Lemma 2. For n ∈ ω +1, the Lindenbaum algebra of intuitionistic propositional logic
on Vn is a Heyting algebra and is in fact isomorphic to Hn via an isomorphism mapping
Vn onto the set of free generators of Hn.
Proof. Straightforward.
2.2 Kripke Models
Deﬁnition 5 (Kripke Frames and Models). A Kripke frame F = (F,≤) is a
partial order. Given a Kripke frame F, Up(F) = {S ⊆ F | S is upward-closed}.
Given any subset S ⊆ F, we let S↑ be the upward-closure of S and S↓ be the
downward-closure of S.
A Kripke model over some Vn is a pair M = (F, f) of a Kripke frame F =
F(M) and a function f = fM: Vn → Up(F). Elements of the underlying set of
F(M) aresaidtobenodesof M. Statementslike α ∈ M, S ⊆ M, etc., meanthat
α is an element of the underlying set of F(M), S is a subset of the underlying
set of F(M), etc.
A pointed Kripke model is a pair (M,α) where α is a node of M.
8We deﬁne a forcing relation  between pointed Kripke models deﬁned over
Vn and Fn by induction as follows:
For x ∈ Vn, (M,α)  x iff α ∈ fM(x).
(M,α) 1 ⊥.
Let φ and ψ be arbitrary propositional formulas in Fn.
(M,α)  φ ∧ ψ iff (M,α)  φ and (M,α)  ψ.
(M,α)  φ ∨ ψ iff (M,α)  φ or (M,α)  ψ.
(M,α)  φ → ψ iff for all β ≥ α, if (M, β)  φ then (M, β)  ψ.
We say that M  φ if for all α ∈ M, (M,α)  φ.
Sometimes if M is clear from context, (M,α)  φ is written α  φ.
Given a Kripke model M, we let ForcesM be the set {(α,φ) | (M,α)  φ}.
This is for notational reasons, so that we may write ForcesM(α) for {φ | α 
φ} and Forces−1
M(φ) for {α | α  φ}. If M is clear from context it may be
suppressed.
Note that a Kripke model M deﬁned over Vn is completely determined by
its underlying frame F together with ForcesM(α) ∩ Vn for all α ∈ F.
Lemma 3 (See [5]). A propositional formula φ ∈ Fn is an intuitionistic tautology iff
for all Kripke models M deﬁned over Vn, M  φ.
We also have the following stronger result.
9Lemma 4 (See [5]). A propositional formula φ ∈ Fn is a intuitionistic tautology iff for
all ﬁnite Kripke models M, deﬁned over Vn, M  φ.
2.3 U(n)
Deﬁnition 6 (U(n)). See [5] and [4].
Given n ∈ N, U(n) is deﬁned to be the minimal Kripke model deﬁned over
Vn satisfying the following properties:
1. For every S ⊆ U(n) and V ⊆ Vn, there is at most one node α such that
Forces(α) ∩ Vn = V and {α}↑ − {α} = S↑. In the case that there is
one such node, we say that node(S,V) exists and denote the unique such
node by node(S,V). In the case that there are no such nodes, we say that
node(S,V) does not exist.
2. For all V ⊆ Vn, node(∅,V) exists.
3. Let S ⊆ Un be such that S has at least 2 minimal elements. Let V ⊆
T
{Forces(α) ∩ Vn | α ∈ S}. Then node(S,V) exists.
4. Let S ⊆ Un be such that S = {β}↑. Let V ( Forces(β) ∩ Vn. Then
node(S,V) exists.
If S ⊆ U(n) has at least 2 minimal elements, we write node(S) for
node

S,
\
{Forces(α) ∩ Vn | α ∈ S}

Deﬁnition 7 (Lm
n ). Given an α ∈ U(n), we let the level of α (written Lev(α)) be
the maximum m such that there are α = α1 < α2 < ···αm in U(n). We deﬁne
Lm
n to be the set of elements of U(n) of level m.
10Proposition 1. [See [5] or [4]] Let φ, ψ ∈ Fn. Then φ intuitionistically implies ψ iff
Forces−1
U(n)(φ) ⊆ Forces−1
U(n)(ψ).
Deﬁnition 8 (Deﬁnable Subsets of U(n)). Let S ⊆ U(n). If there is a φ ∈ Fn such
that Forces−1
U(n)(φ) = S then we say that S is deﬁnable and that φ deﬁnes S.
If S is deﬁnable, then we write φS for a formula which deﬁnes S. (Note
that by Proposition 1 all formulas deﬁning a set are logically equivalent.) If
α ∈ U(n), then we write φα for φ{α}↑ and φ0
α for φU(n)−{α}↓, both of which exist
by Proposition 2.
Lemma 5. Let S be the collection of deﬁnable subsets of U(n). Then hS,⊆i is isomor-
phic to hHn,≤i.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For all α ∈ U(n), {α}↑ and U(n) − {α}↓ are deﬁnable.
This proposition will be proven in Subsection 4.2.2.
Corollary 1. All ﬁnite upward-closed subsets of U(n) are deﬁnable.
2.4 P-morphisms
Deﬁnition9(P-morphisms). LetM andN beKripkemodels. Afunction f : M →
N is a p-morphism if:
• For all variables x and nodes a of M, a  x iff f(a)  x.
• Whenever a ≥ b, f(a) ≥ f(b).
11• Whenever a0 ≥ f(b), there is an a such that f(a) = a0 and a ≥ b.
If there is a surjective p-morphism from M to N, then N is called a p-morphic
reduction of M.
If a Kripke model has no p-morphic reductions besides itself, then it is called
p-morphically reduced.
Deﬁnition 10 (Intuitionistic Equivalence). Two Kripke models M and N are
called intuitionistically equivalent if for all φ, M  φ iff N  φ.
Lemma 6 (see [4]). All ﬁnite Kripke models M have a unique p-morphic reduction
which is p-morphically reduced. This is called the p-morphic reduced form of M.
Proposition 3 (see [5]). Suppose M and N are ﬁnite. Then M and N are intuition-
istically equivalent iff they have a common p-morphic reduction.
Deﬁnition 11 (Reductions and Expansions). Let M be a Kripke model deﬁned
overVn, andlet α and β benodesofM suchthatForcesM(α)∩Vn = ForcesM(β)∩
Vn.
• If β is α’s sole successor, the Kripke model M0 obtained by identifying α
and β is called a Type I reduction of M. The canonical map from M to
M0 is a p-morphism.
• If α and β have exactly the same (proper) successors, then the Kripke
model M0 obtained by identifying α and β is called a Type II reduction
of M. The canonical map from M to M0 is a p-morphism.
• In either case, M is called a Type I or Type II expansion of M0.
12Proposition 4 (see [5] and [4]). Suppose M and N are ﬁnite. Then M and N are
intuitionistically equivalent just in case there is a sequence of Type I and II reductions
taking M to N.
2.5 Trees
Deﬁnition 12 (Alphabets and Ground Terms). Let A be a set of symbols, which
we will call an alphabet. We deﬁne T(A) to be the smallest set of sequences
of symbols from A such that if ti ∈ T(F) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and a ∈ A, then
a(t1,...,tm) ∈ T(F). (Here “a(t1,...,tm)” is a purely syntactic sequence of
symbols, not an actual function application.)
We call T(A) the set of ground terms over the (unranked) alphabet A.
Deﬁnition 13 (Trees). For us, a “tree” is always a ﬁnite labeled tree.
Speciﬁcally, a tree over a set A is a ﬁnite partial order (P,≤) to each element
of which is associated a member of A and which has the property that for all
p ∈ P, p↓ is a linear order.
Note that the set of ground terms over F and the set of tree over F are
essentially the same; we therefore denote them both by T(F).
Deﬁnition 14 (Kripke Trees). A Kripke tree is a Kripke model M over some Vn
such that underlying partial order P of M together with the association p 7→
Forces(p) ∩ Vn is an element of T(P(Vn)).
We let the alphabet that a Kripke tree is over be An.
13Deﬁnition 15 (Kripke Alphabet). For n ∈ ω, let An = P(Vn), considered as an
alphabet. We may also call An the Kripke alphabet over Vn.
Lemma 7 (See [5]). A propositional formula φ ∈ Fn is a intuitionistic tautology iff for
all ﬁnite Kripke models M, deﬁned over Vn, M  φ.
Proof. This follows from the fact that all ﬁnite Kripke models are p-morphic to
Kripke trees. This can be easily proved using only Type II expansions.
Given φ ∈ Fn, we let K(φ) be the set of Kripke trees M deﬁned over Vn
which force φ.
The following lemma will be used in Chapter 4.
Lemma 8. Let M be a ﬁnite Kripke tree. Let α ≤ β ≤ γ be nodes of M. If α↑ is
intuitionistically equivalentb to γup, then so is β↑.
Proof. Suppose β  φ. Then, since β ≤ γ, γ  φ.
Conversely, if β 1 φ, then, since α ≤ γ, α 1 φ.
14CHAPTER 3
IMPLICATIVE FRAGMENT
Deﬁnition 16 (Implicative Fragment of Hn). The implicative fragment of Hn is
the smallest set containing all n free generators and closed under →.
The primary result of this chapter is a combinatorial proof of the fact that for
n ∈ ω, the implicative fragment of Hn is ﬁnite.
The content of the claim that the proof is “combinatorial” is that nothing
about Heyting algebras or Kripke models will be used: the plan of the proof is to
produce certain rewrite rules which will allow one to rewrite any implicational
formula in n variables to one which is logically equivalent and of length ≤ l,
where l depends only on n.
3.1 The Left-Associated Case
The left-associated case is an instructive subcase.
Deﬁnition 17 (Left-Associated Formulas). The set of left-associated implicative
formulas Ln over the variables Vn is the smallest set containing Vn and such that
if φ ∈ Ln and x ∈ Vn, then φ → x ∈ Ln.
For this section only, I will omit parentheses in displaying formulas, since
the parenthesization is unambiguous.
Deﬁnition 18. If φ is a formula of the form
xm−1 → ··· → x0
15then m is called the length of φ. For 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, we deﬁne φi to be xi and ¯ φi
to be xm−1 → ··· → xi.
Proposition 5. There are only ﬁnitely many left-associated formulas up to logical
equivalence.
Proof. This is based on two steps:
Lemma 9. For any φ ∈ Fn and x ∈ Vn, φ → x → x → x is logically equivalent to
φ → x.
Proof. This is simply a standard proof in intuitionistic logic.
Lemma 10. Suppose x, y, and xi for 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 are propositional variables.
Further, suppose 0 < j < k ≤ m − 1 are such that x0 = x, xj = y, and xk = x. Let ψ
be any formula. Then
ψ → y → xm−1 → ··· → x0
is equivalent to
ψ → x → xm−1 → ··· → x0
Lemmas 9 and 10 imply that every left-associated formula is logically equiv-
alent to one of length ≤ 3n3 + 2 (thus giving the proposition) as follows: Con-
sider the rewrite rules on propositions suggested by Lemmas 9 and 10:
ψ → x → x → x → y1 → ··· → yk   ψ → x → y1 → ··· → yk.
and
φ → y → xm → ··· → x1   φ → x → xm → ··· → x1,
where, in the second case, the hypotheses of Lemma 10 hold. It is easy to see
thatthissystemofrewriterulesisstronglynormalizing. Furthermore, givenany
16proposition φ, its normal form ρ under these rewrite rules will have length ≤
3n3 + 2: I claim that each triple (ρ3k,ρ3k+1,ρ3k+2) is distinct (as in Deﬁnition 18,
ρ3k refers to the 3kth propositional variable from the right in ρ, et.: Suppose not
and that
(ρ3k,ρ3k+1,ρ3k+2) = (ρ3k0,ρ3k0+1,ρ3k0+2)
for k < k0. By our ﬁrst rewrite rule, we know that no triple has all three elements
the same, so without loss of generality, say ρ3k 6= ρ3k+1. But then we could apply
our second rewrite rule, as we have 3k < 3k + 1 < 3k0 < 3k0 + 1 and ρ3k = ρ3k0,
ρ3k+1 = ρ3k0+1, ρ3k 6= ρ3k+1.
There are only n3 possible distinct triples. Since the length of ρ is at most 2
over a multiple of 3, this gives a maximum length of 3n3 + 2.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let φ be
ψ → y → xm−1 → ··· → x0
and let ψ be
ψ → x → xm−1 → ··· → x0.
We will use the following sublemma:
Sublemma 1. Let φ and φ be formulas.
Let ∆ be a set of formulas, Γ0(φ,φ0) = {φ0,φ0
1}, Γ2i(φ,φ0) = Γ2i−1(φ,φ0) ∪
{φ0
2i+1} for all i, and Γ2i+1(φ,φ0) = Γ2i ∪ {φ2i+2}.
Then if i is even and ∆,Γi(φ,φ0) ` φ0
i, then ∆,Γi−1(φ,φ0) ` φ0
i−1 and if i is odd
and ∆,Γi(φ,φ0) ` φi, ∆,Γi−1(φ,φ0) ` φi−1.
17Proof. Suppose i is odd and ∆,Γi(φ,φ0) ` φi. Then, as Γi(φ,φ0) = Γi−1(φ,φ0) ∪
{ ¯ φi+1}, ∆,Γi−1(φ,φ0) ` ¯ φi+1 → φi. Since ¯ φi+1 → φi = ¯ φi, ∆,Γi−1(φ,φ0) ` ¯ φi.
Then because ¯ φi−1 ∈ Γi−1(φ,φ0), and ¯ φi−1 = ¯ φi → φi−1, ∆,Γi(φ,φ0) ` φi−1.
The case where i is even is similar.
Sublemma 2. φ, ¯ φ0
1,y ` x
Proof. Clearly, {y},Γj(φ,φ0) ` φj = y. By repeated application of Sublemma 1,
and the fact that φi = φ0
i for i ≤ j, {y},Γ0(φ,φ0) ` φ0 = x. Since Γ0 = {φ, ¯ φ0
1},
we are done.
Sublemma 3. φ0, ¯ φ1,y,` x
Proof. Same as Sublemma 2, but use Γj(φ0,φ) instead of Γj(φ,φ0)
Sublemma 4. ¯ φj, ¯ φ0
j+1,x ` y
Proof. Clearly, {x},Γk(φ,φ0) ` φk = x. By repeated application of Sublemma 1
and the fact that φi = φ0
i for i ≤ k, {x},Γj(φ,φ0) ` φj = y.
Sublemma 5. ¯ φ0
j, ¯ φj+1,x ` y
Proof. Same as Sublemma 4, but use Γk(φ0,φ) instead of Γk(φ,φ0).
To show that φ implies φ0: Suppose that m is odd. By Sublemma 1, we will
be done if we can show that Γm(φ,φ0) ` φm = y, as then Γ0(φ,φ0) = {φ, ¯ φ0
1} ` x
and φ ` ¯ φ0
1 → x = φ0.
18Since m is odd, Γm(φ,φ0) contains ¯ φm+1 and ¯ φ0
m, so Γm(φ,φ0) ` ¯ φm = x.
Therefore, Γm(φ,φ0) ` y by Sublemma 2.
The case where m is even is the same except that we must now apply Sub-
lemma 4 if j is even and 5 if j is odd.
To show that φ0 implies φ: We reason as above, using Γm(φ0,φ) in place of
Γm(φ,φ0). If m is odd, apply Sublemma 3, if m is even: apply Sublemma 5 if j is
even and Sublemma 4 if j is odd.
3.2 The General Case
3.2.1 Preliminaries on Trees
It will be convenient to associate formulas with labeled trees. First, I ﬁx some
notation involving trees.
Deﬁnition 19 (Trees and Related Basic Concepts). A tree T = (|T|,≤) is a ﬁnite
set |T| together with an order relation ≤ on it such that there is an a ∈ |T| such
that a ≤ b for all b ∈ |T| and such that for each b ∈ |T|, {c ∈ |T| | c ≤ b}
is linearly ordered by ≤. Such an a is called the root of T. (Outside of this
paragraph, the variable a is not intended to denote a root of a tree. Also, we will
suppress the distinction between T and |T|.)
If a < b and there is no c such that a < c < b then b is called a child node of a.
If a is a node of T, then the tree ({b | b ≤ a},≤0) where ≤0 is the restriction
of ≤ to {b | b ≤ a} is called the subtree of T below a.
19If b is a child node of a, then the subtree of T below b is called a child tree of a.
A sequence of nodes (α1,α2,...,αn) is called a branch of T if α1 is the root
node of T and αi+1 is a child node of αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. ( αn does not have to
be a leaf.)
A labeled tree T with labels in a set S is a tree T together with a function lT
from the nodes of T to S. All of the above deﬁnitions carry over in an obvious
way to labeled trees.
Deﬁnition 20 (Association of labeled trees to formulas). Given a formula φ, de-
ﬁne T(φ) as follows: If φ = x, then let T(φ) be a single node labeled with x.
If φ is (φ0 → ··· → (φn → x)···), then let T(φ) have root node labeled with
x with child trees T(φ0),...,T(φn).
Since φ → (ψ → x) is equivalent to ψ → (φ → x), it is easily shown that if
T(φ) = T(ψ), then φ and ψ are logically equivalent.
From now on, I will drop the T and simply identify φ and T(φ), when no
confusion will result.
3.2.2 Plan of the Proof
The proof will use analogues of Lemmas 9 and 10 in a roughly similar manner.
We will show the following:
Lemma 11 (Analogue of Lemma 9). There is a number M, depending only on n,
with the following property: Suppose that T is a labeled tree and x is a propositional
20variable. Let
f(T) = max{m | there is a branch (α0,...,αm−1) through T and ∀il(αi) = x}
Suppose f(T) ≥ M. Then there is a T0 logically equivalent to T such that f(T0) <
f(T).
Lemma 12 (Analogue of Lemma 10). Let T be a labeled tree and (α0,...,αm) be
a branch through T. Suppose that 0 < j < k ≤ m − 1 are such that l(α0) = x,
l(αj) = y, l(αk) = x, and l(αm) = y.
Let T0 be the labeled tree whose underlying tree is the same as the underlying tree of
T and with label function given by
lT0(α) =

  
  
lT(α) α 6= αm
x α = αm
Then T and T0 are logically equivalent.
I’ll now indicate how to ﬁnish the proof of the main theorem given these two
lemmas.
Deﬁnition 21 (Label Changes). Let (α0,α2,...,αm−1) be a branch through a tree
T. A pair (αi,αi+1) is called a change of labels if l(αi) 6= l(αi+1).
Corollary 2 (Of Lemma 12). Every tree T is equivalent to some T0 such that no branch
of T0 changes labels more than n(n − 1) times (where n is the number of propositional
variables).
Proof. By using Lemma 12 to suggest a rewrite rule in an analogous manner to
the way we used Lemma 10 to suggest a rewrite rule, we can show that each
21tree T is equivalent to a tree T0 such that for all branches (α0,...,αm−1) through
T0 there are no two label changes (αi,αi+1) and (αj,αj+1) such that j > i + 1,
l(αi) = l(αj) and l(αi+1) = l(αj+1).
Since there are only n(n − 1) possible distinct types of label changes, the
statement follows.
Corollary 3 (Of Lemma 11). Let T be a tree and x be a label such that all nodes of T
that aren’t leaves are labeled with x. Then T is logically equivalent to T0 where T0 has
the same property and has height at most M + 1.
Corollary 4 (Of Corollary 3). Fix a label x and let
C = {T | all non-leaves of T are labeled x}.
Then the number of equivalence classes under logical equivalence of C is ﬁnite.
Proof. Given that if the root of a tree has two isomorphic child trees, then one
can be eliminated while preserving logical equivalence, it is easy to prove that
the number of equivalence classes of trees of some ﬁxed height m is ﬁnite. The
statement then follows immediately from Corollary 3.
Deﬁnition 22 (Top Component of a Tree). The top component c(T) of a tree T is
deﬁned as follows: We let c(T) be the smallest set such that the root node of T is
in c(T), and if α ∈ c(T) and β is a child node of α and l(α) = l(β), then β ∈ c(T).
Deﬁnition 23 (Type of a Tree). Call a tree of type 0 if all of its nodes have the
same label.
Call a tree T of type ≤ n + 1 if for every node α ∈ c(T), all of α’s child trees
whose roots are not in c(T) are of type ≤ n.
Call a tree T of type n if it is of type ≤ n but not ≤ n − 1.
22Lemma 13. For each n there are only ﬁnitely many equivalence classes of trees of type
n.
Proof. This is clear for n = 0.
Since by induction we know that there are only ﬁnitely many trees of type
n, we can apply Corollary 4 (replacing trees of type n by a set of fresh labels) to
show that there only ﬁnitely many trees of type n + 1.
However, it is relatively easy to see that a tree T has type ≥ n just in case it
has a branch which changes labels n times. Since we know from Corollary 2 that
there is an R such that each T is equivalent to a T0 such that no branch changes
labels more than R times, we are done.
3.2.3 Analogue of Sublemma 1
The following sublemma will be used in the proofs of Lemmas 11 and 12.
Sublemma 6. Let W be a labeled tree and let (β1,..., βa) be a branch through it.
Let W0 be a labeled tree obtained from W by removing the child trees of βa, putting
in new child trees of it, and possibly changing the label of βa. Call (β0
1,..., β0
a) the
corresponding branch in W0.
Let Wi be the subtree of W below βi and let W0
i be the subtree of W0 below β0
i. For
2 ≤ i ≤ a, let Wi,0 = Wi and let {Wi,1,...,Wi,gi} enumerate the child trees of βi−1
other than Wi. Make a similar deﬁnition for W0
i,j, so that if j > 0, and 1 ≤ i ≤ a,
Ti,j = T0
i,j.
23Let Γ0 be a set of formulas. Let Γ1 = Γ0 ∪ {W1,W0
2,0 ...,W0
2,g2} and let
Γm =

  
  
Γm−1 ∪ {Wm+1,0,...,Wm+1,g(m+1)} m is even
Γm−1 ∪ {W0
m+1,0,...,W0
m+1,g(m+1)} m is odd
for 2 ≤ m ≤ a.
Then, for 1 ≤ m ≤ a, if m is even and Γm ` l(βm), Γm−1 ` l(βm−1) and if m is
odd and Γm ` l(β0
m), Γm−1 ` l(β0
m−1).
Proof. If m is odd and Γm ` l(β0
m), then we have
Γm−1 ` W0
m+1,0 → (W0
m+1,1 → (···W0
m+1,g(m+1) → l(β0
m)···))
so Γm−1 ` W0
m. Since W0
m−1 ∈ Γm−1 and Wm,i = W0
m,i ∈ Γm−1 for i > 0, Γm−1 `
l(β0
m−1).
Similarly, if m is even and Γm ` l(βm), Γm−1 ` l(βm−1).
3.2.4 Proof of Lemma 11
Lemma 14. Let T be a labeled tree, and let (α1,α2,...,α2n+1) be a branch of T such
that there is some variable (say x) such that each of α1, α2n and α2n+1 are labeled with
x. If for each child tree of α2n+1 whose root is not labeled by x there is a child tree of
α1 that is isomorphic (as a labeled tree) then T is logically equivalent to T0 where T0 is
deﬁned as follows:
Let there be i child nodes of α2n+1 labeled with x and let {Vj,1,...,Vj,gj} enumerate
the child trees of the jth such child node of α2n+1. Let {U1,...,Uq} enumerate the child
trees of α2n apart from the one with root α2n+1.
24Let |T0| = A ∪ B ∪ C ∪ D where A is all nodes of T not below (and not equal to)
α2n, B is i copies of α2n, call them α2n,1 ...,α2n,i, C is i copies of each of U1,...,Uq
and D is a copy of each Vj,k. The ordering on A is inherited from T. (Also let α0
b be the
corresponding node of αb in T for 1 ≤ b ≤ 2n − 1.) Each copy of α2n in B is a child
node of the copy of α2n−1 in A. Each copy of α2n in B has a copy from D of each Ur as a
child tree. The jth copy of α2n has each Vj,k as a child tree.
Proof. Let Tm be the subtree of T below αm for 1 ≤ m ≤ 2n + 1. Let T0
m be the
subtree of T0 below α0
m for 1 ≤ m ≤ 2n − 1. Deﬁne Tm,j for 2 ≤ m ≤ 2n + 2 and
T0
m,j for 2 ≤ m ≤ 2n as has been done previously.
To show that T implies T0: We must show that T1,T0
2,0,...,T0
2,k ` x. Apply
Sublemma 6 with Γ0 = ∅, W = T, W0 = T0, βi = αi, β0
i = α0
i and a = 2n − 1. We
will be done if we can show that Γ2n−1 ` l(α2n−1) = l(α0
2n−1).
Γ2n−1 contains each T0
2n,c and it contains T2n−1. T2n−1 has hypotheses T2n,i for
all i and conclusion l(α2n−1). The formulas T2n,i = T0
2n,i for i > 0 are in Γ2n−1.
So we want to show that Γ2n−1 ` T2n.
The formula T2n has hypotheses T2n+1,i for all i and conclusion x. So consider
Γ2n−1 ∪ {T2n+1,i}. The formula T2n+1 has hypotheses W for all of the child trees
of α2n+1. Those subtrees whose root is not labeled by x are in Γ2n−1 because they
are of the form T2,i for some i. The other hypotheses have the form Z → x for a
tree Z such that there is an α0
2n,i with child trees Z and isomorphic copies of all
the T2n+1,j. As l(α0
2n,i), Γ2n−1 ` Z → x. Thus Γ2n−1 ∪ {T2n+1,i} ` x and we are
done.
To show that T0 implies T: We must show that T0
1,T2,0,...,T2,k ` x. Apply
Lemma 1 with Γ0 = ∅, W = T0, W0 = T, βi = α0
i, β0
i = αi and a = 2n − 1. We
25will be done if we can show that Γ2n−1 ` l(α0
2n−1) = l(α2n−1).
Γ2n−1 contains T0
2n−1. T0
2n−1 has hypotheses T0
2n,i for all i and conclusion
l(α2n−1). So take some particular T0
2n,i and we will show that Γ2n−1 ` T0
2n,i.
The conclusion of T0
2n,i is x and the hypotheses are W for W a child tree of α2n
and Z for Z a child tree of a child node that is labeled x of α2n+1. Let these
hypotheses be Z1,...,Zd and W1,...,Wd. We must thus show that
Γ2n−1 ∪ {Z1,...,Zd,W1,...,Wd} ` x
Γ2n−1 contains T2n which has conclusion x and hypotheses Z1,...,Zd and the
hypothesis T2n+1. So we are now reduced to showing that
Γ2n−1 ∪ {Z1,...,Zd,W1,...,Wd} ` T2n+1
The hypotheses of T2n+1 include a hypothesis of the form Z1 → (···(Zd →
x)···), so we have achieved our goal. Tracing back through the steps, we see
that we are done.
3.2.5 Proof of Lemma 12
Let l be the function which takes nodes to labels for both T and T0 and let α0
i
be the node in T0 corresponding to αi in T. Thus, l(α0
i) = l(αi) unless i = n.
For i > 1, let g(i) be one less than the number of subtrees of αi−1 (equivalently,
α0
i−1).
Let Ti be the subtree of T below αi and T0
i be the subtree of T0 below α0
i. For
i > 1, let Ti,0 = Ti and let {Ti,1,...,Ti,g(i)} enumerate the child trees of αi−1 apart
from Ti. Deﬁne T0
i,m similarly. Note that every child tree of αn is the same as a
26child tree of α0
n. Extending g, let {Tn+1,0,...,Tn+1,g(n+1) be an enumeration of
the child trees of αn and let T0
n+1,i = Tn+1,i. Note that if m > 0, Ti,m = T0
i,m.
Note that we have by deﬁnition that
Tm = Tm+1,0 → (Tm+1,1 → (··· Tm+1,g(m+1) → l(αm)···))
and similarly for T0.
Sublemma 7. T1,T0
2,0,...,T0
2,g(2),y ` x
Proof. Use Sublemma 6 with Γ0 = {y}, W = T, W0 = T0, βi = αi, β0
i = α0
i, and
a = n. Since y ∈ Γj, Γj ` y = l(αj) = l(α0
j). So by repeated application of
Sublemma 6, Γ1 ` x and we are done.
Sublemma 8. T0
1,T2,0,...,T2,g(2),y ` x
Proof. Use Sublemma 6 as above, but with W = T0 and W0 = T (and making the
other corresponding switches).
Sublemma 9. Tj,T0
j+1,0,...,T0
j+1,g(j+1),x ` y.
Proof. Use Sublemma 6, taking Γ0 = {x}, W = Tj, W0 = T0
j, βi = αj+i−1, β0
i =
α0
j+i−1 and a = n − j + 1.
Sublemma 10. T0
j,Tj+1,0,...,Tj+1,g(j+1),x ` y.
Proof. Use Sublemma 6 as in Sublemma 9 but with W = T0
j and W0 = Tj (and
making the other corresponding switches).
To show that T1 implies T0
1: We apply Sublemma 6 with Γ0 = ∅, W = T,
W0 = T0, βi = αi, β0
i = α0
i and a = n. By that Sublemma, we will be done if we
27can show the following: In the case that n is odd, Γn ` x. In the case that n is
even, Γn ` y.
If n is odd, then Γn contains Tn. Since it also contains T0
n+1,0,... T0
n+1,g(n+1)
which are equal to Tn+1,0,...,T0
n+1,g(n+1), Γn ` l(αn), so Γn ` y. Applying Sub-
lemma 7, we see that Γn ` x as required.
If n is even, everything is the same except we must now apply Sublemma 9
if j is odd and Sublemma 10 if j is even.
To show that T0
1 implies T1: Apply Sublemma 6 with Γ0 = ∅, W = T0,
W0 = T, βi = α0
i, β0
i = αi and a = n. We will be done if we can show the
following: In the case that n is even, Γn ` x. In the case that n is odd, Γn ` y. In
the case that n is even, we reason as above and apply Sublemma 8. In the case
that n is odd we apply Sublemma 10 if j is odd and Sublemma 4 if j is even.
28CHAPTER 4
TREE AUTOMATA
4.1 Association between Formulas and Automata
Deﬁnition 24 (Basic Tree Automata Notions). A(n unbounded) deterministic
bottom-uptreeautomatonoveralphabetA isatupleT = (statesT ,acceptT ,∆T )
where statesT is a set, acceptT ⊆ statesT, and ∆T is a function with domain A
such that for a ∈ A, ∆T (a) is a function from states<ω
T to statesT .
We deﬁne T (t) for t ∈ T(A) inductively by letting
T (a(t1,...,tm)) = ∆T (a)(T (t1),...,T (tn)).
For t ∈ T(A) we say that T accepts t if T (t) ∈ acceptT .
Deﬁnition 25 (Preﬁx-Closed Tree Automata). We say that T is preﬁx-closed if
whenever q ∈ statesT − acceptT and s is a sequence in states<ω
T containing q,
∆(a)T (s) ∈ statesT − acceptT for all a ∈ A.
Deﬁnition 26 (Tree Automata and Partial Orders). Let ≤ be a partial order on
statesT . We say that T supports ≤ whenever a ∈ A and s is a sequence in
states<ω
T containing q, ∆T (a)(s) ≤ q.
Deﬁnition 27 (Injective Tree Automata, ∆−1
T ). We say that T is injective if for all
elements a 6= b of A, ran∆T (a) ∩ ran∆T (b) contains only non-accept states.
If T is injective, then we deﬁne the partial function ∆−1
T from statesT to A
by letting
∆−1
T (q) = a such that q ∈ ran∆T (a)
29if there is such an a, and letting ∆−1
T (q) be undeﬁned if there is no such a. If
∆−1
T (q) is undeﬁned, then we write ∆−1
T (q) = ↑.
Note that ∆−1
T isn’t the literal inverse of ∆T .
It is clear that every tree automaton is equivalent to an injective one. From
here on out, we will assume that all tree automata are injective whenever it is
convenient.
Deﬁnition 28 (Tree Automata which Accept Only Kripke Models). The automa-
ton T is said to accept only Kripke models if the following hold:
1. The alphabet of T is An for some n.
2. T is injective.
3. Whenever ∆−1
T (q) = a, b 6⊆ a and s is a sequence in states<ω
T containing q,
∆(b)(s) ∈ statesT − acceptT .
The set of elements of T(F) accepted by T is called L(T ). It is called the set
recognized by T . If a set is recognized by some T , then it is called recognizable.
Deﬁnition 29 (Intuitionistic-Equivalence-Respecting Automata). An automa-
ton T is called intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting if satisﬁes the following prop-
erties:
1. It accepts only Kripke models.
2. For every (accept) state q ∈ statesT , the set {M | T (M) = s} is closed
under intuitionistic-equivalence.
30Thefollowinglemmawillbeausefulcharacterizationofintuitionistic-equivalence-
respecting automata.
Lemma 15. An automaton T is intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting iff it satisﬁes
the following properties:
1. It accepts only Kripke models.
2. It supports a partial order ≤.
3. Thetransitionfunctionsdisregardorderandmultiplicity. Thatis, if{q1,...,qn} =
{q0
1,...,q0
m}, then ∆(a)(hq1,...,qni) = ∆(a)(hq0
1,...,q0
mi).
4. If ∆−1
T (q) = a, then ∆(a)(q) = q.
5. If ∆(a)(S) = q, and q0 is such that there is an q00 ∈ S with q0 ≥P q00, then
∆(a)({q0} ∪ S) = q.
Proof. First suppose that T is intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting. By deﬁni-
tion, it accepts only Kripke models.
We may deﬁne a partial order on the states as follows: Let q ≤ q0 iff there is
a tree t with (upward-closed) subtree t0 such that T (t) = q and T (t0) = q0. This
is clearly reﬂexive and transitive. By lemma 8, it is antisymmetric.
Itisclearthatthetransitionfunctionmustdisregardordersinceintuitionistic-
equivalence disregards order. They must disregard multiplicity since the two
branches may be merged into one with Type II reductions.
The third requirement follows from the fact that Type I reductions preserve
intuitionistic equivalence.
31ThefourthrequirementfollowsfromthefactthatTypeIIreductionspreserve
intuitionistic equivalence.
Conversely, suppose that an automaton satisﬁes all four of the above con-
ditions. The third requirement says that the sets T −1(q) for q ∈ statesT are
closed under Type I expansions and the fourth that the sets T −1(q) are closed
under Type II expansions. Since this holds for all sets, they are all closed un-
der Type I and II expansions and reductions and therefore under intuitionistic-
equivalence.
Theorem 1. Let S ⊆ T(An). There is a φ ∈ Fn such that S = K(φ) iff there is a
preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting tree automaton T whose alphabet is
An such that S = L(T ).
Proof. We will ﬁrst show right-to-left. Let T be a preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-
equivalence-respecting tree automaton.
For q ∈ statesT , let Tq be the tree automaton deﬁned to be the same as T
except that acceptTq = {q0 ∈ P | q0 ≥ q}.
Let Bn = {q ∈ statesT | |{q0 | q0 ≥ q}| = n}. Let B≤n =
S
i≤n Bi.
We will show the following by induction on n: For each q ∈ Bn, there is a
formula φq such that M  φq iff M is accepted by Tq. There is also a formula φ0
q
such that M  φ0
q iff for all α ∈ M, T (α) 6= q.
We will need the following lemma:
Lemma 16. Let q1,...,qn ∈ statesT be pairwise incomparable and such that there
exist formulas φq1,...,φqn,φ0
q1,...,φ0
qn as above.
32Let a ⊆ Vn.
Then there is a formula ψ such that whenever M is ﬁnite, M  ψ iff there does
not exist a node α ∈ M such that Forces(α) ∩ Vn = a, each immediate successor
αi of α forces some φqj, for each j there is some immediate successor αi of α such that
T (αi) = qj, and α doesn’t force
W
φqi.
Proof. Let ψ0 be
_
φ0
qi →
_
φqi
Let ψ1 be
V
a. Let ψ2 be (
W
v∈Vn−a v) →
W
φqi. Let ψ be
(ψ0 ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2) →
_
φqi
Suppose M  ψ. Let α ∈ M be such that Forces(α) ∩ Vn = a, each immedi-
ate successor of α forces some φqi, and each qi is the T -state of some immediate
successor of α. Then we would like to show that α forces ψ0 ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
First, ψ0. All of its successors force ψ0, since they all force
W
φqi. Therefore,
α  ψ0, since it does not force
W
φ0
qi: If it did, it would force some φ0
qi, but it has
a successor with T -state qi for each i.
We have that α forces ψ1 by construction. We also have that α forces ψ2: all
of its successors do, since they all force its consequent, and α does since it does
not force its hypothesis.
Conversely, let M have the property in statement in the lemma. We would
like to show that every element of M forces ψ. For a contradiction, take an
α ∈ M such that α 1 ψ but all of its successors force ψ.
33Then α must force ψ0 ∧ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 but not
W
φqi. Since α  ψ1, Forces(α)∩Vn ⊃
a. Since α  ψ2 and α 1
W
φqi, Forces(α) ∩ Vn ⊆ a, so Forces(α) ∩ Vn = a.
Since α forces
W
φ0
qi →
W
φqi, and does not force
W
φqi, it must not force
W
φ0
qi.
Therefore, it must not force any φ0
qi. Since it doesn’t force any φ0
qi, α must have
successors of T -state qi for each i.
Wewanttoshowthatallof α’ssuccessorsforce
W
φqi andthatforeach i, α has
an immediate successor of T -state qi. Suppose ﬁrst that α had a successor which
did not force any φqi. Then, since it forces ψ, it must not force
W
φ0
qi →
W
φqi. But
α forces this, which is a contradiction.
We now show that for each i, α has an immediate successor of T -state qi.
Suppose there is an i for which α does not have such an immediate successor.
It does have some successor of T -state qi. Let β be a successor with T -state qi
of minimal distance from α. Let its immediate predecessor be β0. Since β0 is a
successor of α, β0 
W
φqi. Since the qi are incomparable and β0’s successor has
T -state qi, β0 must have T -state qi. This contradicts the minimality of β.
Thus, by the assumed property of M, α must force
W
φqi, which is a contra-
diction.
If S = {q1,...qn} and a ⊆ Vn, we will call the ψ given by the lemma φ0
S,a.
Let q ∈ B1. Then q has no successors in statesT . If ∆−1
T (q) = ↑, then Tq
accepts no trees and we can take φq = ⊥, φ0
q = >.
Otherwise, let a = ∆−1
T (q). Since q hasno successors, wemust have ∆(a)() =
q, or else we would again have that Tq accepts no trees. So Tq accepts exactly
those Kripke models where every node forces exactly the elements of a.
34We may thus let φq =
V
v∈a v ∧
V
v∈V−a ¬v and φ0
q = ¬φq.
We are done with the n = 1 case. Suppose we have proven the induction
hypothesis for n, and we will show it for n + 1.
Let q ∈ Bn+1. As above, we may assume that ∆−1
T (q) exists and equals a. Let
{S1,...,Sn} be the set of pairwise incomparable S ⊆ Bn such that ∆(a)(S) = q.
As above, we may assume that there is at least one such S.
Let φ0
q be the formula
(
^
i
φ0
Si,a) →
_
q0>q
φq0
Let φ1
q be the formula
V
v∈a v. Let φ2
q be the formula (
W
v∈V−a v) →
W
q0>q φq0.
We let φq =
V
i=0,1,2 φi
q and φ0
q = φq →
W
q0>q φq0.
Suppose M is a rooted Kripke model which forces φq. Let α be the root node
of M. We want to show that it is accepted by Tq, i.e., that T (α) ≥ q. If α forces
φq0 for some q0 > q, then by induction we are done. So assume that α doesn’t
force any such φq0.
We will show this by induction on the number of α’s successors which do
not have T -state strictly greater than q.
Suppose ﬁrst that α has no such successors.
Then, since α  φ1
q ∧ φ2
q, we know that Forces(α) ∩ Vn = a. Since α  φ0
q
but α 1
W
q0>q φq0, α must not force
V
i φ0
Si,a. Therefore, there is some i such
that α does not force φ0
Si,a. By the lemma above, that means that α must have
some successor β such that Forces(β) ∩ Vn = a and for each q0 ∈ Si, there is an
immediate successor of β of T -state q0. Thus, the T -state of β is q. Since all of α’s
35successors have T -state strictly greater than q, β must equal α, and the T -state
of α is q.
For the induction step, we note that that by induction, α has some succes-
sor of T -state q. It follows by the properties of the intuitionistic-equivalence-
respecting automaton that α must have T -state q.
Conversely, we want to show that if α is a node such that T(α) ≥ q then α
forces φq. If T(α) > q then we are done by induction, so suppose that T(α) = q.
We will prove this by induction on the number of successors β of α such that
T(β) = q.
Suppose ﬁrst that α has no such successors. Let α’s immediate successors be
A = {α1,...,αr}. Let T (A) = {T (α1),...,T (αr)}. It is immediate that α forces
φ1
q. It is also the case that α forces φ2
q, since α does not force any atomic formulas
other than those in a and all of its successors force φq0 for q0 > q.
All of α’s successors force φ0
q, since they all force its consequent. So we just
have to show that α does not force its hypothesis. This follows from the fact that
the set T (A) must be some Si.
Now, by induction, we just have to prove that if one of α’s immediate suc-
cessors β is such that T(β) = q, then α will force φq. That α forces φ1
q and φ2
q
is clear, using the inductive hypothesis. By induction, all of α’s successors force
φ0
q. But then α forces φ0
q since it doesn’t force its hypothesis, since β doesn’t force
its hypothesis.
The deﬁnition for φ0
q works just as in [4].
This completes the right-to-left direction, as we may now take the formula φ
36to be the disjunction of φq for all accept states q.
For the left-to-right direction: Let φ be a formula. Let statesT be the power
set of the set of subformulas of φ, ordered by inclusion. Let acceptT be the set
of sets of subformulas of φ that include φ.
Given a ⊆ Vn, deﬁne ∆(a)(S) where S is a set of sets of subformulas of φ as
follows: If there is an s ∈ S such that there is no rooted Kripke model M such
that for all subformulas ψ of φ, M  ψ iff ψ ∈ s, then let ∆(a)(S) = ∅.
Otherwise, for each s ∈ S, let Ms be a rooted Kripke model K such that for
all subformulas ψ of φ, M  ψ iff ψ ∈ s. Let M be the Kripke model gotten
by taking the disjoint union of the Ms’s and adding a new root node α below
each of them such that Forces(α) ∩ Vn = a. (If this is not possible because some
s doesn’t contain all of the formulas in a, then let ∆(a)(S) = ∅.)
Let ∆(a)(S) be the set of subformulas of φ forced by M. This is independent
of the particular Kripke models Ms that are chosen. Everything can be veriﬁed
easily.
We also have the following reformulation.
Theorem 2. Fix n and let S be a set of Kripke models deﬁned over Vn. Then there is a
φ such that S = {M | M  φ} iff S is closed under taking upward-closed submodels,
under intuitionistic equivalence, and is recognizable by some tree automaton.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is clear.
For the right-to-left direction, let S be as in the statement of the theorem,
and let it be recognized by T . We must show that there is a preﬁx-closed
37intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automaton whose language is also S.
We may assume that T is injective. It follows that T is already preﬁx-closed.
We will show that the reduction of T in the sense of the Myhill-Nerode theorem
for tree automata (see [6]) satisﬁes the requirements.
By the Myhill-Nerode theorem for tree automata, there is an automaton T 0
which is equivalent to T and which we may also take to be injective with the fol-
lowing property: Let q, q0 ∈ statesT 0. If (T 0(t) ∈ acceptT 0 iff T 0(t0) ∈ acceptT 0)
whenever t0 is the same as t except for possibly changing a subtree of T 0-state q
to one of T 0-state q0, then q = q0.
Thisispreciselythepropertyweneed: If t and t0 areintuitionisticallyequiva-
lent, then the fact that S is closed under intuitionistic-equivalence implies using
the above that T 0(t) = T 0(t0).
Deﬁnition 30. If T is a tree automaton which accepts only Kripke models with
alphabet An, φ ∈ Fn, and L(T ) = K(φ), then we say that T represents φ or that
T is a representation of φ.
Deﬁnition31(Kripke-AccessibleNodes). IfT isatreeautomatonwhichaccepts
only Kripke models we deﬁne the set of its Kripke-accessible nodes to be
{q ∈ statesT | ∃ a Kripke model M such that T (M) = q}.
384.2 Some First Applications
4.2.1 A Useful Class of Deﬁnable Sets
Deﬁnition 32. Let S be a set of pairwise incomparable nodes of U(n). (In prac-
tice, S will always be ﬁnite.)
We let
f(S) = {node(T,V) | T ⊆ S and V ⊆ Vn and node(T,V) exists}.
We let ¯ S be the closure of S under f. In other words, ¯ S =
S
m∈ω f (m)(S). We let
Sl = S↑ ∪ ¯ S.
Proposition 6. Let S ⊆ U(n) be ﬁnite and pairwise incomparable. Then Sl is deﬁn-
able.
Proof. Let S0 = S↑ − S. Construct a preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-equivalence-
respecting automaton T as follows: Let the set of states, Q be S0 ∪ {◦a}a⊆Vn ∪
{•} where • and the ◦a are new states. The only non-accept state is •.
We will deﬁne ∆ so that ∆−1(s) = Forces(s)∩Vn for s ∈ S0 and ∆−1(◦a) = a.
For a ⊆ Vn and T ⊆ statesT , we let
∆(a)(T) =

          
          
node(T,a) T ⊆ S0 and node(T,a) exists and is ∈ S0
◦a T ⊆ S0 and node(T,a) exists and is ∈ S
◦a ∃b◦b ∈ S and • / ∈ S and (∀q ∈ S) a ⊆ ∆−1(q)
• otherwise
By construction, T accepts a node β iff β ∈ Sl, so we may take φS to be the
formula associated to T .
394.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall the statement of the proposition:
Proposition. For all α ∈ U(n), {α}↑ and U(n) − {α}↓ are deﬁnable.
Proof. Let α be a node in U(n).
Firstweshowthat φα exists. Constructapreﬁx-closedintuitionistic-equivalence-
respecting automaton T as follows: Let statesT = {α}↑∪{•}, where • is a new
state. The only non-accept state is •.
For a ⊆ Vn and S ⊆ statesT , we let
∆(a)(S) =

  
  
node(S,a) node(S,a) exists and is ≥ α
• otherwise
By construction, T accepts a node β iff β ≥ α, so we may take φα to be the
formula associated to T .
That φ0
α exists is a consequence of Proposition 6, as U(n)−{α}↓ = Sl, where
S = L
Lev(α)
n − {α}.
4.2.3 Hn for n ≥ 2 is not complete
Alatticeiscalledcompleteifeverysethasaleastupperbound. In[4]itisproven
that Hn is not complete for n ≥ 2. The proof is as follows: A countably inﬁnite
set of pairwise incomparable elements A = {α0,α1,...} ⊆ U(n) is constructed.
It is proven that if S1, S2 ⊆ A are distinct, then the least upper bounds of S1 and
40S2 must be distinct (if they exist). The fact that Hn is not complete then follows
by a cardinality argument.
Using Proposition 4, we can give an easy proof that Aφ = {φα0,φα1,...} itself
has no least upper bound.
Let φ be an upper bound for Aφ, and we will ﬁnd a strictly lower upper
bound. Let T be a preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automa-
ton associated to φ. By the pigeonhole principle, there must be i 6= j such that
T (αi) = T (αj). Let β = node({αi,αj},Forces(αi)∩Vn). Since T is intuitionistic-
equivalence-respecting, we must have T (β) = T (αi). Thus β is accepted by T ,
and it therefore forces φ.
Since A is incomparable, β / ∈ A↑. Therefore φ ∧ φ0
β < φ is also an upper
bound for A.
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THE ORDER-THEORETIC STRUCTURE OF HN
5.1 Statement of the Theorems
Deﬁnition 33 (Quasisemilattices). A quasisemilattice (qsl) is a poset (P,≤) such
that for any two elements p and q, the set {r ∈ P | r ≤ p,r ≤ q} of lower bounds
of p and q has only ﬁnitely many maximal elements and such that every lower
bound of p and q is below at least one such maximal element.
If p and q are elements in a qsl, we deﬁne
p ∧ q = {r | r a maximal lower bound of p and q}
A qsl is called bounded (a bqsl) if it has a minimum element.
A qsl is called locally ﬁnite if it is locally ﬁnite under the relation R(p,q,r)
which holds iff r is a maximal lower bound of p and q.
A bqsl embedding between two bqsls Q1 and Q2 is an order-embedding f
that respects the minimal element ⊥ and is such that for all p, q ∈ Q1, f(p∧q) =
f(p) ∧ f(q). (Note that p ∧ q, f(p ∧ q), and f(p) ∧ f(q) are sets, while f(p) and
f(q) are elements.)
Aqslisuniversalcountableboundedlocallyﬁniteifitiscountable, bounded,
and locally ﬁnite, and embeds all countable, bounded, locally ﬁnite qsls.
By a standard Fra¨ ıss´ e argument, there is a unique universal countable ho-
mogeneous locally ﬁnite bounded quasisemilattice. Let it be Q.
42Deﬁnition 34 (Join-Irreducibles, J1,n, J2,n, J3,n, J4,n). A join-irreducible formula is a
⊥ 6= φ ∈ Hn such that if φ is equivalent to ψ ∨ χ, then φ is equivalent to ψ or φ
is equivalent to χ.
Let Jn = {φ ∈ Hn | φ is join-irreducible}.
For each n, let J1,n = {φ ∈ Jn | (∃<∞ψ)ψ < φ}.
Let J2,n be the set of minimal elements of Jn − J1,n.
Let J3,n = Jn − (J1,n ∪ J2,n ∪ {>}).
Let J4,n = {>}.
As discussed below in Section 5.2, J1,n is characterized completely by the
properties of U(n) (and is, in fact, equal to the dual of the underlying partial
order of U(n)). We clearly understand J4,n.
Theorem 3. For all n ≥ 2, J2,n is a countably inﬁnite antichain and J3,n ∪ {⊥} is
isomorphic to Q.
Every element of J2,n has an element of J1,n below it. Every element of J3,n has an
element of J2,n below it.
If x ∈ Ji,n and y ∈ Jj,n and x ≤ y, then i ≤ j.
Proof. Proposition 7 states that every element of Jn has an element of J1,n below
it.
Proposition 9 states that J2,n is a countably inﬁnite antichain and that every
element of J3,n has an element of J2,n below it.
43Proposition 11 states that J3,n ∪ {⊥} is isomorphic to Q.
The ﬁnal statement follows immediately from the deﬁnitions.
5.2 J1,n
Let P1,n be the underlying partial order of U(n) with the ordering reversed.
Proposition 7 (Implicit in [4]). P1,n and J1,n are order-isomorphic. Every element
of Hn besides the minimal element has an element of J1,n below it. A join-irreducible
formula φ is in J1,n iff Forces−1
U(N)(φ) is ﬁnite.
The isomorphism sends α to φα.
5.3 Join-Irreducibles
Here we will collect some useful lemmas and propositions.
Proposition 8. Let φ be a formula, and T be an automaton representing it. Then φ is
join-irreducible iff T has a minimum Kripke-accessible accepting state.
Proof. Suppose φ is join-irreducible, represented by T , and let M be the set of
T ’s minimal Kripke-accessible accepting states. We know from above that φ is
logically equivalent to
_
q∈M
φq
(since they are forced by the same ﬁnite tree Kripke models). Furthermore, if
q1, q2 ∈ M are distinct, then φq1 is not logically equivalent to φq2: Since qi is
44Kripke-accessible there is some ﬁnite Kripke tree Ni such that T (ni) = qi. Then,
φq1 is not forced by N2 and vice versa.
Thus, if |M| ≥ 2, φ is not join-irreducible.
Conversely, let |M| = 1 (say M = {m}), and suppose that φ = φ1 ∨ φ2. For
a contradiction, suppose that φ1 1 φ2 and φ2 1 φ1. Then there is a ﬁnite Kripke
tree N1 which forces φ1 but not φ2 and a ﬁnite Kripke tree N2 which forces φ2
but not φ1, as well as a ﬁnite Kripke tree N3 such that T (N3) = m. Consider
the Kripke tree N formed by taking the disjoint union of N1, N2, and N3, and
adding a new node below each Ni and which forces exactly the propositional
variables forced by N3.
Since T is an intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting tree automata, T (N) =
m, so N forces φ. So either φ1 or φ2 must be forced by N, and in either case we
have a contradiction to the assumed properties of either N2 or N1.
There is a corollary to this which is interesting in its own right.
Corollary 5. If φ is not join-irreducible, then it is equivalent to φ0 ∨ ··· ∨ φr, where
each φi is a conjunction of subformulas of φ, each φi is join-irreducible, and no φi is
equivalent to φ.
Proof. This follows by taking the particular automaton T representing φ con-
structed in the last section where the states are sets of subformulas of φ.
Lemma 17. Suppose φ1,...,φm are any formulas, ψ is join-irreducible, and ψ ≤ φ1 ∨
··· ∨ φm. Then there is an i such that ψ ≤ φi
Proof. Since ψ ≤ φ1 ∨ ··· ∨ φm, ψ is equivalent to ψ ∧ (φ1 ∨ ··· ∨ φm) and thus
45to (ψ ∧ φ1) ∨ ··· ∨ (ψ ∧ φm). Since ψ is join-irreducible, it must be equivalent to
some ψ ∧ φi, and therefore must be less than φi.
5.4 J2,n
Proposition9. J2,n isacountablyinﬁniteantichain. Everyelementof Jn −(J2,n ∪ J1,n)
has an element of J2,n below it.
An element φ of Jn is in J2,n iff for all but ﬁnitely many m, |Lm
n ∩Forces−1
U(n)(φ)| =
2.
Proof. We begin with a few deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 35 (Well-Positioned Triplets of Nodes). Let α, β, and γ be three dis-
tinct nodes in U(n). The ordered triplet (α, β,γ) is called well-positioned if the
following properties hold:
1. Lev(α) + 1 = Lev(β) + 1 = Lev(γ).
2. γ < β.
3. γ 6< α.
4. Forces(α) ∩ Vn = Forces(β) ∩ Vn = Forces(γ) ∩ Vn.
Deﬁnition 36 (Aα,β,γ, χm
i ). Let (α, β,γ) be a well-positioned triplet of nodes with
α ∈ Li
n and Forces(α) ∩ Vn = U. For each m ∈ N with m ≥ Lev(α), deﬁne two
nodes χm
0 and χm
1 as follows:
χ
Lev(α)
0 = α, χ
Lev(α)
1 = β, χ
Lev(α)+1
1 = γ.
46χm+1
0 = node({χm
0 ,χm
1 })
χm+2
1 = node({χm
0 ,χm+1
1 })
Note that χm
j ∈ Levm.
Let Aα,β,γ = {ρ | ρ ≥ α or γ} ∪ {χm
i | m ∈ N,i ∈ {0,1}}. Note that
Aα,β,γ = {χ
Lev(α)+1
0 ,γ}l.
Thesetsoftheform Aα,β,γ willturnouttobeexactlythesetsin{Forces−1
U(n)(φ) |
φ ∈ J2,n}.
By Proposition 6, we know that for each well-positioned triplet (α, β,γ) of
nodes, Aα,β,γ = {χ
Lev(α)+1
0 ,γ}l is deﬁnable by a formula φ
{χ
Lev(α)+1
0 ,γ}l. We will
write φα,β,γ for φ
{χ
Lev(α)+1
0 ,γ}l when (α, β,γ) is a well-positioned triple.
The fact that these φα,β,γ are in J2,n is seen by observing that for sufﬁciently
large m, |Aα,β,γ ∩ Lm
n | = 2, that every ρ ∈ Aα,β,γ has some ρ0 > ρ such that
ρ0 ∈ Aα,β,γ, and the following simple lemma.
Lemma18. Let φ besuchthatthereisan m suchthat|Forces−1
U(n)(φ)∩Lm
n | = 1. Then
for all m0 ≥ m + n, |Forces−1
U(n)(φ) ∩ Lm
n | = 0. In particular, |Forces−1
U(n)(φ)| < ∞.
Proof. Straightforward.
We now show that there are no other minimal formulas and that every ele-
ment of Jn − J1,n has a minimal element of Jn − J1,n below it with the following
proposition.
47Proposition 10. Let φ be a join-irreducible such that Forces−1
U(n)(φ) is inﬁnite. Then
there is a well-posititioned triplet (α, β,γ) ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) such that Aα,β,γ is a subset
of Forces−1
U(n)(φ).
Proof. Let T represent φ, and let q be the minimum Kripke-accessible accepting
state of T . By the properties of intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automata,
if we ﬁnd a well-positioned tuple (α, β,γ) such that T (α) = T (β) = T (γ) we
will be done.
Let α0 be such that T (α0) = q. Since Forces−1
U(n)(φ) is inﬁnite, there must be
some β0 6= α0 such that Lev(β0) = Lev(α0).
Let α1 = node({β0,α0}). We have that T (α1) = q. Since Forces−1
U(n)(φ) is
inﬁnite, there must be a β1 6= α1 such that Lev(β1) = Lev(α1)
First assume that β1 < α0. If there is any γ0 such that Lev(γ0) < Lev(α2) and
γ0 6≥ α2 then we may take α = β2, β = α2, γ = node({α2,γ0}). Otherwise, there
must be some γ0 such that Lev(γ0) < Lev(α2) and γ0 6≥ β2 (otherwise α2 would
equal β2). Then we may take α = α2, β = β2 and γ = node({β2,γ0}).
If β1 6< α0 then repeat the argument of the above paragraph with β2 =
node({α0, β1}) and α2 = node({β1,α1}).
Corollary 6. For any join-irreducible φ with representing automaton T and minimum
Kripke-accessible accepting state q, the following are equivalent:
1. φ ∈ J3,n ∪ J4,n.
2. Therearethreeincomparablenodes α1, α2, α3 suchthatfor1 ≤ i ≤ 3, T (αi) = q.
483. For any m, there is an r such that |T −1(q) ∩ Lr
n| ≥ m.
Proof. 1 =⇒ 2: Let φ ∈ J3,n ∪ J4,n and let (α, β,γ) be a well-positioned tuple of
nodes in Forces−1
U(n)(φ).
By assumption, there is a δ ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) − Aα,β,γ. Let T (µ) = q. First
assume that µ ∈ Aα,β,γ.
Then all ν ∈ Aα,β,γ of sufﬁciently high level must satisfy T (ν) = q. Since
Forces−1
U(n)(φ) is inﬁnite, every element of Forces−1
U(n)(φ) must have a predeces-
sor in Forces−1
U(n)(φ): if some µ0 didn’t, then φ would not be join-irreducible as it
would be equivalent to (φ ∧ φ0
µ0) ∨ φµ0.
Thus, we can ﬁnd some predecessor δ0 of δ on the same level as two elements
χ0, χ1 of Aα,β,γ satisfying T (χ0) = T (χ1) = q. Then we can take our three in-
comparable nodes to be node({δ0,χ0}), node({δ0,χ1}), and node({δ0,χ0,χ1}).
Now assume that µ / ∈ Aα,β,γ. Take a predecessor µ0 of µ that is on the same
level as two elements χ0, χ1 of Aα,β,γ. Then we may take our three incomparable
nodes to be node({µ0,χ0}), node({µ0,χ1}) and node({µ0,χ0,χ1}).
2 =⇒ 3: Let α1, α2, and α3 be three incomparable nodes with T (αi) = q
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. We may suppose that Lev(α1) = Lev(α2) = Lev(α3): If
not, say without loss of generality that Lev(α1) ≥ Lev(α2),Lev(α3). Then we
may replace α1, α2, α3 with α0
1 = node({α1,α2}), α0
2 = node({α1,α3}), α0
3 =
node({α1,α2,α3}).
So suppose the common level of the αi’s is l.
Then at level l + 1 we have four nodes of T -state q:
491. node({α1,α2,α3})
2. node({α1,α2})
3. node({α2,α3})
4. node({α1,α3})
Clearly, if at any level s0, we have r nodes of T -state q, then at level s0 + 1, we
have at least (
r
2) nodes of type q. Since the function r 7→ (
r
2) is strictly increasing
for r ≥ 4, we are done.
3 =⇒ 1: Clearly Forces−1
U(n)(φ) is inﬁnite, so φ / ∈ J1,n. If φ ∈ J2,n, then
|k(φ) ∩ Lm
n | would be 2 for all sufﬁciently large m.
5.5 J3,n
We begin with some facts about qsls.
Lemma 19. Any ﬁnite set of elements in a bqsl has only ﬁnitely many maximal lower
bounds, and any element less than all elements of a ﬁnite set is less than some maximal
lower bound of that set.
Proof. We will prove it for a set of three elements. The general case is by induc-
tion.
Let p, q, and r be elements of a bqsl. Let p ∧ q = {s1,...,sm}. Then
S
i(r ∧ si)
is ﬁnite and every element which is less than all three of p, q and r is less than
some element of
S
i(r ∧ si): since it’s less than p and q, it’s less than some si and
therefore is less than some element of r ∧ si. The conclusion follows.
50Lemma 20. If Q∗ ⊆ Q∗∗ are ﬁnite bqsl’s, then there is a sequence Q∗ = Q0 ⊆ Q1 ⊆
··· ⊆ Qm = Q∗∗ such that each Qi is a bqsl, |Qi+1| = |Qi| + 1, and each inclusion of
Qi in Qi+1 is a bqsl embedding.
Proof. Let q be a minimal element of Q∗∗ − Q∗. Let Q1 = Q∗ ∪ {q}. This is a
bqsl: for any p ∈ Q∗, the maximal lower bounds of p and q must be in Q∗∗,
therefore they must be in Q∗ ∪{q} since q was minimal in Q∗∗ − Q∗. Repeat the
process.
Lemma 21. Let φ ∈ J3,n. Let S be a ﬁnite collection of join-irreducible formulas such
that for all ψ ∈ S, φ 6≤ ψ. There is a ρ ∈ J3,n such that ρ < φ and for all ψ ∈ S,
Forces−1
U(n)(ρ) ∩ Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) is ﬁnite.
Proof. Let T be a preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automaton
associated to φ, and let q be the minimum Kripke-accessible accepting state of
T . Let α be such that T (α) = q. Let S = {ψ1,...,ψm}. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let
αi ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) − Forces−1
U(n)(ψi) By Corollary 6, ﬁnd an r greater than the
level of each αi such that there are four nodes γ1,...,γ4 in Lr
n such that for
1 ≤ i ≤ 4, T (γi) = q.
Let δj = node({αi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪{γj}) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. Then a ρ satisfying the
required properties is one which deﬁnes {δ1,δ2,δ3}l.
Proposition 11. The set J3,n ∪ {⊥} is isomorphic to Q.
Proof. Let J be J3,n with a minimum element ⊥ added.
51First we observe that J is a bounded locally ﬁnite quasisemilattice. It has
a minimum element. Given any two formulas φ and ψ, φ ∧ ψ is their greatest
lower bound in Hn. Although it may not be join-irreducible, it can be written as
ρ1 ∨ ··· ∨ ρm with each ρi join-irreducible. The maximal elements among those
ρi in J3,n are then the maximal lower bounds of φ and ψ in J3,n and there are only
ﬁnitely many of them. If no ρi is in J3,n, then the maximum lower bound of φ
and ψ in J is ⊥.
We now show that J is locally ﬁnite. Given join-irreducible φ and ψ, their
maximal lower bounds are the maximal join-irreducibles less than φ ∧ ψ. By
Corollary 5 and Lemma 17 these are formed out of subformulas of φ and ψ by
∧ and ∨. Iterating the process still yields formulas formed out of subformulas
of φ and ψ by ∧ and ∨. Thus, there can only be ﬁnitely many such formulas.
We now prove that it is the universal countable homogeneous locally ﬁnite
bounded quasisemilattice by showing that for any ﬁnite bounded quasisemilat-
tice Q1, any bqsl embedding f from Q1 into Jn, and any bqsl embedding g from
Q1 into Q2 where |Q2| = |Q1| + 1, there is an extension h of f along g from Q2
into Jn which is also a bqsl embedding.
Let q be the unique element of Q2 − Q1. Let U = {f(p) | p ∈ Q1, p > q},
K = {f(p) | p ∈ Q1, p 6< q, p 6> q} and L = {f(p) | p ∈ Q1, p < q}.
Assume U is nonempty. Then by Lemma 19, there must be a minimum ele-
ment of U. Let it be u∗. If U is empty, let u∗ be >.
LetT beapreﬁx-closedintuitionistic-equivalence-respectingautomatonrep-
resenting u∗ and let q be the minimum accepting Kripke-accessible state of T .
52First assume that L has more than one maximal element.
Since u∗ isnotlessthananyelementof K∪ L, wecanﬁnd, foreach ψ ∈ K∪ L,
an element αψ ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(u∗) that is not in Forces−1
U(n)(ψ). By Corollary 6, we
can ﬁnd two incomparable nodes β1 and β2 at a level greater than any αψ ∈
K ∪ L and such that T (β1) = T (β2) = q.
Let β = node({αψ | ψ ∈ K ∪ L} ∪ {β1}) and let β0 = node({αψ | ψ ∈
K ∪ L} ∪ {β2}). Note that β and β0 are incomparable, T (β) = T (β0) = q and
for all ψ ∈ K ∪ L, β, β0 / ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(ψ).
Our new element φ (representing q) will be φ0
β → (
W
ρ∈L ρ ∨ φβ).
Let R1 = {β}. For n > 1, let Rn be
{node(R) | R ⊆
[
i<n
Ri ∪ k(
_
L) and R ∩
[
i<n
Ri 6= ∅}.
Lemma 22. Forces−1
U(n)(φ) =
S
i Ri ∪ {β}↑ ∪ Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L).
Proof. We will ﬁrst show that
S
i Ri ∪ {β}↑ ∪ Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L) ⊆ Forces−1
U(n)(φ).
Clearly Forces−1
U(n)(φβ), Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L), and R1 are subsets of Forces−1
U(n)(φ).
We will also show that no element of any Ri forces φ0
β. Clearly the sole ele-
ment of R1 does not force it.
Assume Rn ⊆ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) and that no element of Ri for i ≤ n forces φ0
β.
Let R ⊆
S
i<n Ri ∪ Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L) and R ∩
S
i<n Ri 6= ∅.
Since there is an element of R that does not force φ0
β, node(R) doesn’t force
it either, and thus forces φ0
β → (
W
ρ∈L ρ ∨ φβ) since all of its successors force φ.
Thus, node(R) forces φ.
53We will now show that Forces−1
U(n)(φ) ⊆
S
i Ri ∪ {β}↑ ∪ Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L).
Suppose α ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φ), α / ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φβ), and α / ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L).
Since α 1 φβ ∨
W
L, we must have α 1 φ0
β. Thus α ≤ β. It follows that every
node in
S
i Ri is less than β
Given any α0 ≤ β, let α0 = α0
0 < α0
1 < ··· < α0
n(α0) = β where α0
i+1 is an
immediate successor of α0
i and n(α0) is as large as possible.
We will show by induction on m that for all α0 ≤ β such that α0  φ, α0 ∈
Rm+1 iff n(α0) ≤ m.
The case where m = 0 is clear.
Suppose that it’s true for m and we’ll show it true for m + 1. First, let α0 ∈
Rm+1. Then α0 = node(R), where R ⊆
S
i≤m Ri∪Forces−1
U(n)(φβ)∪Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L).
The maximum distance to β is given by the maximum distance from one if its
immediate successors plus one.
Conversely, if n(α0) ≤ m, then since all of its successors must force φ, the
oneslessthan β arein Rm, andtheonesnotlessthan β mustbeinForces−1
U(n)(φβ)∪
Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L), α0 must be in Rm+1.
Thus we are done, as each α0 ≤ β such that α  φ is in some Rm (namely,
Rn(α0)).
We must show that φ is different from every element of L, K, and U, that it
is less than every element of u∗, greater than every element of L, incomparable
with every element of K, and for each ψ ∈ K, the maximal lower bounds of φ
and ψ are in L.
54Clearly, φ is above every element of L. We have that φ is different from each
ψ ∈ L, since β  φ but β 1 ψ.
By construction, φ is below u∗, and it is different from u∗ as β0  φ0
β but
β0 1
W
L, so β0 ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(u∗) − Forces−1
U(n)(φ).
We will show that φ is incomparable with each element of K. Fix a ψ ∈ K.
Since β ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) but not in Forces−1
U(n)(ψ), we have ψ 6≤ φ. On the other
hand, the intersection of Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) with Forces−1
U(n)(φ) must be contained
in Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L) ∪ Forces−1
U(n)(φβ), as every element of Forces−1
U(n)(φ) is either
below β, orcontainedinForces−1
U(n)(
W
L)∪Forces−1
U(n)(φβ) byLemma22. Since ψ
cannot be below
W
L∨φβ by Lemma 17, there must be an element Forces−1
U(n)(ψ)
not in Forces−1
U(n)(φ). Of course, it follows that φ is not equal to any element of
K.
Let ψ ∈ K. In order to show that ψ and φ have the same maximal lower
bounds in K ∪ L ∪ U ∪ {φ} as they do in J3,n ∪ {⊥}, we must show that every
χ ∈ J3,n such that χ ≤ ψ ∧ φ is less than some element of L. But, as observed
above Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩Forces−1
U(n)(φ) is contained in Forces−1
U(n)(
W
L ∨ φβ). Since
χ is join-irreducible and Forces−1
U(n)(χ) is inﬁnite, χ is less than some ρ ∈ L.
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EMBEDDINGS
6.1 A Lattice-Embedding from Hm to Hn for m ≥ 1, n ≥ 2
Theorem 4. Let n ≥ 2, m ≥ 1. Then there are φ, ψ ∈ Hn such that Hm is isomorphic
to [φ,ψ]. In addition, the isomorphism from [φ,ψ] to Hm can be extended to a surjective
lattice-homomorphism from Hn to Hm.
Proof. The main work is contained in the following proposition.
Proposition 12. Let m ≥ 2 and n be such that there is a level Li
n of U(n) and a set
A ⊆ Li
n such that |A| = m and each α ∈ A has some immediate successor not above
any other α0 ∈ A. Then there is are φ, ψ ∈ Hn such that Hm is lattice-isomorphic to
[φ,ψ] andinaddition, theisomorphismfrom[φ,ψ] to Hm canbeextendedtoasurjective
lattice-homomorphism from Hn to Hm.
Proof. Fix A and i from the hypothesis.
Let A = {α1,...,αm}. For each i, let αi be an immediate successor of αi not
above any other αj. Let φ be
_
i
φαi.
For each A0 ⊆ A, let γA0 = node(A0 ∪
S
α/ ∈A0 α,∅). This is valid as the ele-
ments of T are pairwise incomparable and |T| ≥ 2 since m ≥ 2.
Note that γA0 is at level i + 1 if A0 is nonempty and at level i if A0 is empty.
Since each αi has a successor not above any other αj, if A0 6= A00, γA0 6= γA00.
56Let ψ deﬁne {γA0 | A0 ⊆ A}l.
Deﬁne g: U(m) → U(n) by:
1. g(nodeU(m)(∅,U)) = γA0 where A0 = {αk | xk ∈ Vm − U}.
2. g(nodeU(m)(T,U)) = nodeU(n)(T0,∅), where T0 = {g(δ) | δ ∈ T} ∪ {αk |
xk ∈ Vm − U}.
We must show that g is well-deﬁned, i.e., that node(T0,∅) exists, which it
might not, if, for example, T0 has a single minimal element.
Lemma 23. The function g is well-deﬁned and preserves order and nonorder. For all
β ∈ U(m) and xk ∈ Vm, β  xk iff g(β) 6≤ αk.
Proof. We will prove by induction on i that g restricted to
S
j≤i L
j
m satisﬁes the
conditions in the statement of the lemma.
For i = 0, observe that {g(node(∅,U)) | U ⊆ Vm} is pairwise incomparable
and that if U 6= U0, g(node(∅,U)) is not equal to g(node(∅,U0)) as they have
different immediate successors. It is also the case that for all node(∅,U) ∈ L0
m
and xk ∈ Vm, node(∅,U)  xk iff xk ∈ U iff γA0 6≤ αk, where A0 = {αk | xk ∈
Vm − U}.
Now suppose g restricted to
S
j≤i Li
m satisﬁes the hypotheses in the statement
of the lemma.
Let node(T,U) ∈ Li+1
m . If T has at least two minimal elements, we are done.
If T = {β}↑, then U ( Forces(β) ∩ Vm and T0 must contain both g(β) and αk,
where xk ∈ Forces(β) ∩ Vm − U. Since β  xk, g(β) 6≤ αk. Since it is fairly easy
to see that each αk is not less than any element of the range of g, we must have
57that T0 has at least 2 minimal elements.
It is immediate then that g restricted to Li+1
m is preserves order and the im-
mediate successor relation. Each element of Li+1
m is of the form node(T,U). Ob-
serve that if U 6= U0 and node(T,U),node(T,U0) ∈ U(m), then g(node(T,U))
is not equal to g(node(T,U0)) as they have different immediate successors. Sim-
ilarly, if T↑ 6= T0↑ then g(node(T,U)) 6= g(node(hT0,U0i)) as they have differ-
ent immediate successors. We can now conclude that g preserves nonorder by
using the inductive hypothesis and the fact that g preserves the immediate suc-
cessor relation.
Lemma 24. The sets ran(g) and Forces−1
U(n)(φ) are disjoint and
ran(g) ∪
−1
Forces
U(n)
(φ) =
−1
Forces
U(n)
(ψ) (= {γA0 | A0 ⊆ A}l)
Proof. It is immediate that ran(g) and Forces−1
U(n)(φ) are disjoint.
We will ﬁrst show that ran(g) ∪ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) ⊆ Forces−1
U(n)(ψ). It is clear
thatForces−1
U(n)(φ) ⊆ Forces−1
U(n)(ψ). Sinceeverynodeinran(g) isatlevel≥ i+1
and every successor of a node in ran(g) is in ran(g) or k(φ), by induction every
element of ran(g) is in {γA0 | A0 ⊆ A}l.
WewillnowshowthatForces−1
U(n)(ψ) ⊆ ran(g)∪Forces−1
U(n)(φ). Byconstruc-
tion, Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ Li
n = Forces−1
U(n)(φ) ∪ {γA} and Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ Li+1
n =
ran(g) ∩ Li+1
n = ran(g|L0
m) − {γA}. We will show that Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ L
j
n ⊆
ran(g|L
j−(i+1)
m ) for all j ≥ i + 1 by induction on j. We just observed that this
holds for j = i + 1.
58Suppose it holds for j. A node of Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ L
j+1
n must be of the form
node(T,∅) for T ⊆ Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ (
S
k≤j Lk
n). Since T must contain an ele-
ment of Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ L
j
n and every such node is below every element of
Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ Li−1
n , T must be a subset of Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) ∩ (
S
i≤k≤j Lk
n). Let
S = g−1(T ∩(K
j
n −Ki
n)) and U = {xk | αk ∈ T ∩ Li
n}. Then g−1(nodeU(n)(T,∅))
is nodeU(m)(hS,
T
µ∈S Forces(µ) ∩ Vm − Ui)
It follows from Lemmas 23 and 24 that g is an order-isomorphism from U(m)
to Forces−1
U(n)(φ) − Forces−1
U(n)(ψ).
Deﬁne f : Fm → Fn by:
1. f(⊥) = φ
2. f(xi) = (φ0
αi ∨ φ) ∧ ψ
3. f(ρ0 ∧ ρ1) = f(ρ0) ∧ f(ρ1).
4. f(ρ0 ∨ ρ1) = f(ρ0) ∨ f(ρ1).
5. f(ρ0 → ρ1) = (f(ρ0) → f(ρ1)) ∧ ψ.
Lemma 25. For any ρ ∈ Fm, φ ` f(ρ) ` ψ. If δ = g(γ) then γ  ρ iff δ  f(ρ).
Proof. The proof that φ ` f(ρ) ` ψ is an easy proof by induction on ρ.
We now prove the second part of the lemma by induction on ρ.
For ρ = ⊥, the result is immediate. The observation that γ  xi iff δ 6< αi
furnishes the case where ρ is xi. The inductive steps follow from the existence of
59the order-isomorphism g from U(m) to Forces−1
U(n)(ψ) − Forces−1
U(n)(φ) and the
fact that φ ` f(ρ) for all ρ.
Note that it follows from Lemma 25 that f is injective and hence an embed-
ding.
Wenowdeﬁneafunctionfrom Fn to Fm thatisaninverseto f whenrestricted
to [φ,ψ]. Deﬁne h from Fn to Fm as follows:
1. h(⊥) = h(xj) = ⊥.
2. h(ρ0 ∧ ρ1) = h(ρ0) ∧ h(ρ1).
3. h(ρ0 ∨ ρ1) = h(ρ0) ∨ h(ρ1).
4. If there is some δ ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) ∩
S
j<i L
j
n such that δ 1 ρ0 → ρ1, then
h(ρ0 → ρ1) = ⊥. Otherwise,
h(ρ0 → ρ1) = (h(ρ0) → h(ρ1)) ∧
^
{xj | αj 1 ρ0 → ρ1}
Lemma 26. Let δ = g(γ). For all ρ ∈ Fn, δ  ρ iff γ  h(ρ).
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the level of γ and the structure of ρ.
If ρ is ⊥ or xi, then δ 1 ρ and γ 1 h(ρ).
The inductive step for ρ = ρ0 ∨ ρ1 and ρ = ρ0 ∧ ρ1 is straightforward.
Let ρ be ρ0 → ρ1. Suppose δ  ρ. Then, since for every µ ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(φ) ∩
S
j<i L
j
n, δ < µ, h(ρ) = (h(ρ0) → h(ρ1)) ∧
V
{xj | αj 1 ρ}. Since δ  ρ, if αj 1 ρ,
δ 6< αj. It follows that γ  xj. Thus γ forces the right conjunct of h(ρ).
60Suppose δ  ρ0 and δ  ρ1. Then we are done by the inductive hypothesis
on the structure of ρ. Otherwise, suppose δ 1 ρ0. Then we are done by the
inductive hypothesis on the structure of ρ and the level of γ.
Now suppose δ 1 ρ. Then there is some µ ≥ δ such that µ  ρ0 and µ 1 ρ1.
If µ is in the range of g then we are done by induction. If µ ∈
S
j<i L
j
n, then
h(ρ) = ⊥ and we are done. Otherwise µ ∈ Li
n and is some αj. Since δ < αj,
γ 1 xj and γ 1 h(ρ).
It follows from Lemma 26 and Lemma 25 that if φ ` ρ ` ψ, then f(h(ρ)) = ρ.
If n ≥ 2, m ≥ 2 then we can ﬁnd a level in U(n) satisfying the hypotheses of
the Proposition. For example, we may pick a level in U(n) of cardinality greater
than 2m, call 2m of its elements β1,..., β2m, and let
A = {node({β1, β2},∅),...,node({β2m−1, β2m},∅)}.
If m = 1, then we may let φ be ⊥ and ψ be x2 ∧ ... ∧ xn. The embedding f
from H1 to [φ,ψ] ⊆ Hn sends ρ to ρ ∧ x2 ∧ ... ∧ xn. We may deﬁne a surjective
lattice homomorphism h from Hn to H1 that is an inverse to f as follows:
h(x1) = x1
h(xi) = > for 1 < i ≤ n
h(φ ∧ ψ) = h(φ) ∧ h(ψ)
h(φ ∨ ψ) = h(φ) ∨ h(ψ)
61h(φ → ψ) = h(φ) → h(ψ)
By [4], Hn for n ≥ 2 has an inﬁnite descending chain, while H1 does not, so
there is no embedding of Hn into H1 for n ≥ 2.
6.2 A Lattice-Embedding from Hω to Hn for n ≥ 2
Theorem 5. There is a lattice-embedding from Hω into H2
Proof. Pick α1,α2,α3,α4,α5 ∈ U(2), all at the same level, say i.
Let φ be φ{αj|1≤j≤4}l and let ψ be φ{αj|1≤j≤5}l.
Deﬁne a sequence {β
j
i | i ∈ ω, j ∈ {1,2,3,4}} as follows: let β
j
0 = αj. For
i ≥ 0, let {β
j
i+1 | j = 1,2,3,4} be a collection of four distinct nodes of the same
level, withLev(β1
i+1) > Lev(β1
i) andsuchthattheyallforce¬¬(φβ2
i ∨φβ3
i ∨φβ4
i).
For example, we may take β1
i+1 = node({β2
i, β3
i},∅), β2
i+1 = node({β2
i, β4
i},∅),
β3
i+1 = node({β3
i, β4
i},∅), and β4
i+1 = node({β2
i, β3
i, β4
i},∅).
As in [4] (where a very similar construction is done), the nodes of {β1
i | i ∈
ω} are pairwise incomparable, and they all force φ.
Deﬁne a Kripke model K over Vω as follows: The set of nodes of K is the set
Forces−1
U(2)(ψ) − Forces−1
U(2)(φ) and a node α forces xi iff α 6≤ β1
i.
Lemma 27. For all φ,ψ ∈ Fω, Forces−1
K (φ) ⊆ Forces−1
k (ψ) iff φ ` ψ.
Proof. Since K is a Kripke model, if φ ` ψ, Forces−1
K (φ) ⊆ Forces−1
K (ψ).
62Suppose φ 6` ψ. Then there is a rooted ﬁnite Kripke model K0 over Vω such
that K0  φ and K0 1 ψ. Since variables not occurring in φ or ψ are irrelevant, we
may assume that each node of K0 forces coﬁnitely many propositional variables.
Deﬁne a map a: K0 → K inductively on K0 as follows: If γ ∈ K0 is a node
such that a(γ0) has deﬁned for all immediate successors of γ, then let a(γ) be a
node whose set of successors in U(2) is the upward-closure of the set {β1
i | γ 1
xi} ∪ {a(γ0) | γ0 ≥ γ} ∪ {α5}.
For each i, γ  xi iff a(γ)  xi. Since a is also order-preserving and its
range is upward-closed in K, we have that if γ is the root of K0, a(γ)  φ and
a(γ) 1 ψ.
Now, as before, deﬁne f : Fω → F2 by:
1. f(⊥) = φ
2. f(xi) = (φ0
β1
i
∨ φ) ∧ ψ
3. f(ρ0 ∧ ρ1) = f(ρ0) ∧ f(ρ1).
4. f(ρ0 ∨ ρ1) = f(ρ0) ∨ f(ρ1).
5. f(ρ0 → ρ1) = (f(ρ0) → f(ρ1)) ∧ ψ.
By precisely the same argument as before, this is an embedding.
Note that, by [4], in any interval [φ,ψ] ⊆ Hn, there are atomic elements.
As there are no atomic elements in Hω, Hω cannot be embedded in Hn as an
interval.
636.3 Impossibility of Lattice-Embedding Bω into Hω
Let Bω be the countable atomless Boolean algebra. We will think of it as the
Lindenbaum algebra of classical propositional logic on Vω.
Proposition 13. There is no lattice embedding from Bω into Hn for any n or into Hω.
Proof. By the previous theorem, it sufﬁces to prove the proposition for H2. Sup-
pose there is a lattice embedding of Bω into H2. Call it f.
LetT beapreﬁx-closedintuitionistic-equivalence-respectingautomatonrep-
resenting f(>) and suppose it has n states. Consider the 2n formulas φ1 =
x1 ∧ ··· ∧ xn, φ2 = x1 ∧ ··· ∧ ¬xn,...,φ2n = ¬x1 ∧ ··· ∧ ¬xn. Since f pre-
serves ∧ and ∨ we must have that {Forces−1
U(n)(f(φi)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n} is a
partition of Forces−1
U(n)(f(>)) − Forces−1
U(n)(f(⊥)) and that Forces−1
U(n)(f(φi)) ∩
(Forces−1
U(n)(f(>)) − Forces−1
U(n)(f(⊥))) is non-empty for each i.
Foreachi, let βi ∈ Forces−1
U(n)(f(φi))∩(Forces−1
U(n)(f(>))−Forces−1
U(n)(f(⊥))).
By the pigeonhole principle, there must be some i and j, i 6= j, such that T (βi) =
T (βj). Let β be node({βi, βj}). By the properties of intuitionistic-equivalence-
respectingautomata, T (β) = T (βi), so β  f(>). Thus, β isinForces−1
U(n)(f(φm))∩
(Forces−1
U(n)(f(>)) − Forces−1
U(n)(f(⊥))) for some m. Without loss of generality,
say m 6= i. Then βi  f(φm) and βi  f(φi) but βi 1 f(⊥), a contradiction.
646.4 Order-Embeddings
As an immediate corollary of the characterization in Theorem 3, we have the
following.
Proposition 14. All countable semilattices can be semilattice-embedded into Hn for
n ≥ 2.
Since all countable partial orders P can be order-embedded into some count-
able lattice P0 (for example, let P0 be the lattice generated by the elements of
P(P) of the form p↓ for p ∈ P), this gives the following:
Proposition 15. All countable partial orders can be order-embedded into Hn for n ≥ 2.
A natural further question is to ask when a countable lattice can be lattice-
embedded into Hn for n ≥ 2. Since each Hn is distributive, distributivity is a
necessary condition. It is easy to see that if a distributive lattice L is such that
every element is a ﬁnite join of join-irreducibles, then its join-irreducibles form
a quasisemilattice. From Theorem 3, we get the following:
Proposition 16. If L is a countable distributive lattice with the property that every
element is a ﬁnite join of join-irreducibles and such that its quasisemilattice of join-
irreducibles is locally ﬁnite, then L lattice-embeds into Hn for n ≥ 2.
Deﬁnition 37. A division of an element a of a distributive lattice is a ﬁnite set
{bi} such that a =
W
{bi} and for each i, bi 6≤
W
j6=i{bj}.
An element a of a distributive lattice is called arbitrarily divisible if for each
n it has a division of cardinality n.
65For example, every element of the countable atomless boolean algebra is
arbitrarily divisible. It is the case that no arbitrarily divisible element of a lattice
can be a ﬁnite join of join-irreducibles. Therefore, the following proposition is a
partial converse to Proposition 16.
Proposition 17. Suppose L is a distributive lattice with an arbitrarily divisible ele-
ment. Then it cannot be lattice-embeded into any Hn.
Proof. It sufﬁces to show that no element of Hn is arbitrarily divisible. Sup-
pose that a is, and consider its representation as a tree automaton T . Let m =
|statesT | and let {bi} be a division of cardinality m + 1.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 1, let αi be a node of U(n) such that αi  bi and αi 1
W
j6=i bj.
By the pigeonhole principle, there must be i0 and i1 such that T (αi0) = T (αi1).
Therefore, node({αi0,αi1}) is also accepted by T and therefore forces a. But,
since it is below both αi0 and αi1, it cannot force any bi, which is a contradiction.
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EXISTENCE PROBLEMS
7.1 Automata Substitution
Deﬁnition 38. Let T be an automaton whose alphabet is An+1. Let S be an
automaton with alphabet An. The automaton T [S/xn+1] is deﬁned as follows:
Its alphabet is the same as the alphabet of S. The set statesT [S/xn+1] is equal to
{(t,s) | t ∈ statesT ,s ∈ statesS,x ∈ ∆−1
T (t) iff s ∈ acceptS}.
The transition is given by
∆T [S/xn+1](a)(S) =

  
  
∆T (a ∪ {xn+1})(π1(S)) ∆S(a)(π2(S)) ∈ acceptS
∆T (a)(π1(S)) ∆S(a)(π2(S)) / ∈ acceptS
where π2(S) = {s | (∃t)(t,s) ∈ S}.
A state (t,s) is accepting iff t is accepting in T .
Lemma 28. Let φ ∈ Fn+1 and ψ ∈ Fn. Suppose that T represents φ and S represents
ψ. Then T [S/xn+1] represents φ[ψ/xn+1].
Proof. Straightforward.
Deﬁnition39. GivenanautomatonT , let kripkeT bethesetofKripke-accessible
states of T .
Deﬁnition 40. Suppose that T is an automaton whose alphabet is An+1. Let S
be an automaton with alphabet An. We say that S is ﬁnely grained with respect
to T if for all s ∈ kripkeS there is exactly one t ∈ kripkeT such that (t,s) is a
67Kripke-accessible node of T [S/xn+1]. In this case, we let pS be a function from
kripkeS to kripkeT such that for all s ∈ kripkeS, (p(s),s) ∈ kripkeT [S/xn+1].
Lemma 29. Suppose that T is an automaton whose alphabet An+1. Let S and S0 be
automata whose alphabet is An. Suppose that S and S0 are ﬁnely grained with respect
to T and that T [S/xn+1] accepts all Kripke models.
Let f : kripkeS0 → kripkeS be such that for all q ∈ kripkeS0, ∆−1
S0 (q) =
∆−1(f(q)) and p(q) = p(f(q)). Suppose also that for all S ⊆ kripkeS0, ∆S0(V)(S)
is accepting iff ∆S(V)(f(S)) is accepting.
Then T [S0/x] accepts all Kripke models.
Proof. Let t be a Kripke (tree) model. Then t is of the form a(t1,...,tm) where if
each ti is of the form ai(•), then for all i, a ⊆ ai.
Thestate π1(T [S0/x](t)) dependsononlytwothings: theset{π1(T [S0/x](ti)) |
1 ≤ i ≤ m} and whether or not ∆S0(a)({π2(T [S0/x](ti)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}) is ac-
cepting.
Let t0 be a(t0
1,...,t0
m) where for each i, t0
i is a Kripke model such that S(t0
i) =
f(S0(ti)). Then, byhypothesis, {π1(T [S0/x](ti)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} = {π1(T [S/x](t0
i)) |
1 ≤ i ≤ m} and ∆S0(a)({π2(T [S0/x](ti)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}) is accepting iff
∆S0(a)({π2(T [S/x](t0
i)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}) isaccepting. Therefore, π1(T [S0/x](t)) =
π1(T [S/x](t0)).
Since T [S/x] accepts all Kripke models, π1(T [S/x](t0)) must be accepting.
Therefore, T [S0/x] accepts t. Since t was arbitrary, we are done.
687.2 Solutions to Equations
Deﬁnition 41. Let φ be a propositional formula with a variable x. A solution to
φ(x) = > is a propositional formula ψ such that φ[ψ/x] is a tautology.
Proposition 18. The set of φ(x) which have a solution is a decidable set.
Proof. We prove this by showing the following lemma:
Lemma 30. Suppose that there is some S such that T [S/x] accepts all Kripke mod-
els. Then there is an S0 such that T [S0/x] accepts all Kripke models and statesS0 =
statesT .
Proof. We may assume that S is ﬁnely grained with respect to T and that x =
xn+1 where the alphabet of T is An+1.
Let statesS0 = statesT . The transition function ∆S0 will be given by the
following lemma:
Lemma 31. There is a transition function ∆S0 (and a corresponding notion of a Kripke-
accessible state of S0) and a function f from the Kripke-accessible states of S0 to the
Kripke accessible states of S such that for all S ⊆ statesS0 and a ⊆ Vn,
∆S0(a)(S) =

  
  
∆T (a ∪ {xn+1})(S) ∆S(a)(f(S)) accepting
∆T (a)(S) ∆S(a)(f(S)) not accepting
and for all Kripke-accessible states q of S0, ∆−1
S0 (q) = ∆−1
S (f(q)).
Proof. We will deﬁne a ﬁnite sequence of partial functions f0 ⊆ f1 ⊆ ··· ⊆ fm
from statesS0 to the set of Kripke-accessible states of S and let f = fm.
69For each fi, let
(∆S0)i(a)(S) =

  
  
∆T (a ∪ {xn+1})(S) ∆S(a)(fi(S)) accepting
∆T (a)(S) ∆S(a)(fi(S)) not accepting
for all a and all S ⊆ dom fi.
Let f0 = ∅. Suppose fi has been deﬁned. If for all a and all S ⊆ dom fi,
(∆S0)i(a)(S) ∈ dom fi, then stop and let f = fi and ∆S0 = (∆S0)i.
Otherwise, pick a a and an S for which (∆S0)i(a)(S) / ∈ dom fi and let
f((∆S0)i(a)(S)) = ∆S(a)(f(S)).
By construction, we are done.
Let accept0
S = {q | q Kripke-accessible as a state of T and xn+1 ∈ ∆−1
T (q)}.
By Lemma 29, we are done.
Let T represent φ. By Proposition 30, if there is any automaton S such that
T [S/x] accepts all Kripke models, then there is one with exactly as many states
as T has, and there are only ﬁnitely many such automata.
Note that this also implies that there is an algorithm deciding whether an
arbitrary equation ψ(x) = χ(x) has a solution by letting φ(x) be ψ(x) ↔ χ(x).
707.3 An Existentially Closed Embedding
Let U∗(n) be the set of upward-closed subsets of U(n), given its natural Heyting
algebra structure. There is a canonical embedding of Hn into U∗(n).
Proposition 19. The embedding of Hn into U∗(n) is existentially closed.
Proof. Let µ(x) be a formula with one free variable in the language of Heyting
algebras.
Let u ∈ U∗(n) be such that U∗(n) |= µ(u). Let ν(x) be a formula of the form
φ(x) = > ∧ ψ(x) 6= > such that U∗(n) |= ν(u) and ∀x(ν(x) → µ(x)).
We will ﬁnd a w ∈ Hn such that Hn |= ν(w).
Let T0 be a ﬁnite preﬁx-closed intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automa-
tonrepresenting φ andT1 aﬁnitepreﬁx-closedintuitionistic-equivalence-respecting
automaton representing ψ.
We extend the concept of automaton to include automata with possibly in-
ﬁnitely many states. We view upward-closed subsets U ⊆ U(n) as automata TU
where statesTU = U(n) ∪ {•}, acceptTU = U, and
∆TU(V)(S) =

  
  
node(S,V) node(S,V) exists
• otherwise
Thus, by assumption, T0[Tu/x] accepts all Kripke models, and T1[Tu/x] does
not accept all Kripke models. We must show that there is a ﬁnite preﬁx-closed
intuitionistic-equivalence-respecting automaton S with the same property.
Let f = π1 ◦ T0[Tu/x].
71Let K be a Kripke (tree) model not accepted by T1[Tu/x]. Let (statesS)0 be
the set of nodes in K together with •. Let
(∆S)0(V)(S) =

      
      
node(S,V) node(S,V) ∈ (statesS)0
• node(S,V) does not exist
↑ otherwise
Suppose (statesS)i and (∆S)i are deﬁned. If (∆S)i(V)(S) is deﬁned for all V
and all S ⊆ (statesS)i then let statesS = (statesS)i and ∆S = (∆S)i.
Otherwise, pick a V and an S ⊆ (statesS)i such that (∆S)i(V)(S) is not
deﬁned. If there is some q ∈ (statesS)i such that f(q) = f(node(S,V)) then let
(statesS)i+1 = (statesS)i and let (∆S)i+1(V)(S) = q and otherwise be the same
as (∆S)i.
If there is no such q then let (statesS)i+1 = (statesS)i ∪ {node(S,V)} and
let (∆S)i+1(V)(S) = node(S,V) and otherwise be the same as (∆S)i.
Let acceptS = u ∩ statesS.
That T1[S/x](K) is non-accept is clear, since by construction, T1[S/x](K) =
T1[Tu/x](K).
That T0[S/x] accepts all Kripke models follows from Lemma 29.
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